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I. INTRODUCTION
Several recent articles have argued for the capitalization and amortization,
under the federal income tax, of outlays for higher education,' and other
I See Loretta C. Argrett, Tax Treatment of Higher Education Expenditures: An Unfair
Investment Disincentive, 41 SYRACUSE L. REv. 621 (1990); David S. Davenport, Education
and Human Capital: Pursuing an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W.
RFs. L. Rnv. 793 (1992) [hereinafter Davenport I]; David S. Davenport, The 'Proper'
Taxation of Hwnan Capital, 52 TAX NOTES 1401 (1991) [hereinafter Davenport 11]; Brian
Lebowitz, On the Mistaxation of Investment in Human Capital, 52 TAX NOTES 825 (1991);
Christopher RJ. Pace, The Problem of High-Cost Education and the Potential Cure in
Federal Tax Policy: "One Riot, One Ranger," 20 I.L. & EDUC. 1 (1991); Clifford Gross,
Comment, Tax Treatment of Education Expenses: Perspectives from Normative Theory, 55
U. Cm. L. REv. 916 (1988). Because education is available free of charge up through the
twelfth grade, the amortization issue will be deemed to pertain only to college, graduate and
professional school, and postsecondary vocational education. Amortization of precollege
private school outlays will not be discussed here because, if the case cannot be made for
amortization of college expenses, that for amortization of precollege expenses collapses a
fortiori, given that early schooling expenses are considered to be less income related than
later schooling expenses. Moreover, if we assume that the commitment to free education
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authors have reached the same conclusion.2 This Article argues the contrary
position.
The amortization issue will be approached from the point of view of the
"tax policy" norms of neutrality, 3 (horizontal) equity,4 and the Haig-Simons
definition of "income" as being the net increases in wealth plus the personal
consumption of the taxpayer during the taxable period. 5 The case for
amortization fails to pass muster. It is better that the income tax system simply
ignore human capital-as is presently the case-than attempt to account for it in
a highly selective manner. I shall also deal with certain other tax issues relating
to human capital, such as amortization of professional licences and deduction of
continuing education, job seeking, and moving expenses. 6
This Article also provides a critique of the dominant mode of legal tax
policy scholarship, which relies excessively on the Haig-Simons definition of
income. I argue that the Haig-Simons concept is itself "derived" from the more
fundamental policy criteria of neutrality and ability-to-pay fairness, but these
criteria themselves are problematical in various ways, including being partially
inconsistent with each other.
A third theme of this Article is that the Haig-Simons income concept is
susceptible to being both misconceived and misapplied in its "personal
consumption" component. Personal consumption, which is "taxed" by
disallowing any deduction for it,7 is conventionally identified by its alleged
characteristic of yielding personal pleasure or utility. In my view, it is more
through twelfth grade is to be maintained, the real policy decision involves the possible
subsidization of private education (through vouchers), not federal tax write-offs.
2 See RICHARD GOODE, THE INDIvIDuAL INCoME TAx 80-87 (1976) (stating education
is intended to meet minimum requirements for obtaining employment); Richard Goode,
Educational Expenditures and the Income Tax, in EcoNoMIcs OF HIGHER EDUCATION 281
(Selma Mushkin ed., 1962); Daniel I. Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living
Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 859, 903-05
(1974); Bernard Wolfman, The Cost of Education and the Federal Income Tax, in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNuAL JUDICiAL CONFERENCE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRcurr,
reprinted in 42 F.R.D. 437, 535-51 (1966). See generally John K. McNulty, Tax Policy
and Tuition Creit Legislation: Federal Income Tax Allowances for Personal Costs of
Higher Education, 61 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1973).
3 Briefly, "neutrality" posits that highly elastic investments should be taxed alike in
order to promote allocative efficiency, which refers to an economy that produces the
"right" quantity of various goods and services at the "right" prices, thereby maximizing
aggregate social welfare.
4 Briefly, "(horizontal) equity" means that taxpayers in the same economic position
should be taxed alike.
5 See HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).
6 See infra text accompanying notes 171-93.
7 See I.R.C. § 165(c) (1988), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 485-86 (1993); I.R.C.
§ 167(a) (Supp. 1i 1991), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 466-67 (1993); I.R.C. § 262 (1988).
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properly linked to the "neutrality" idea that accretions to wealth should only be
taxed once. Thus, consumption should be deducted (only) where it is a "cause"
of future income. But because the causal nexus is often loose, the issue of
whether certain categories of consumption should be deducted is an open one
that cannot be resolved by a priori reasoning.
The infirmity of the Haig-Simons income concept necessitates analysis of
income tax policy issues on their merits, that is, in terms of fairness,
economics, and other possible norms. Thus, one cannot avoid asking whether
amortizating higher education costs would be a good thing.8 At this level, the
issue cannot be resolved by vague appeals to international economic
competitiveness and an assumed need for more higher (or vocational) education
for more people. Furthermore, even if current levels of higher education were
insufficient, it would not follow that a tax benefit in the form of amortization of
education costs would be sound policy. Finally-and with implications beyond
tax policy-it appears that current levels of higher education are sufficient, and
that priorities for federal government aid to education lie elsewhere.
II. APPLYING TAX POLICY CRITERIA
This Part applies the criteria of neutrality, horizontal equity, substantive
fairness (ability-to-pay), and Haig-Simons income to educational outlays in
particular and human capital in general.
A. Neutrality
The neutrality argument for amortization of educational outlays is that
investment in human capital should compete within the tax system on a "level
playing field" with investments in conventional assets. Otherwise, scarce
resources will be misallocated in the economy, that is, the tax system will
breed economic inefficiency, in this case producing aggregate underinvestment
in human capital.
The neutrality justification for amortization must show that: (1) a viable
market in education exists, (2) investment in education is disfavored, (3) there
is high elasticity between educational investment and conventional investment,
and (4) amortization would in fact improve neutrality. None of these points
withstands scrutiny.
8 Cf Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax As Insurance: The Casualty Loss and Medical
Expense Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Preniuns, 79 CAL. L. REv.
1485, 1486-87 (1991).
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1. Viability of Education Market
Application of the neutrality criterion to investment in higher education
presupposes, among other things, that investment in education occurs in a
relatively free market. The existence of such a market might be "proven" in at
least two ways. First, there would appear to be a free market in higher
education if the private cost thereof equals the present value of incremental
future earnings attributable to the education, using a discount rate equal to the
prevailing return on relatively low-risk conventional investments. 9 Second, one
could directly inquire into the structure of the market in higher education.
a. The Hwnan Capital Hypothesis
Some studies from the late 1950s and early 1960s-originating from the
"Chicago school" of neo-classical economics-showed that the private (as
opposed to social) rate of return on college education was close to, or even in
excess of, the rate of return on conventional investments.10 This correlation is
circumstantial evidence that potential students actually approach investments in
9 Investment in human capital, unless highly specialized, would not seem to involve
any higher risk than equity investments generally. The freedom to not use one's educational
investment does not increase the riskiness of it, because such nonuse would be self-inflicted.
But cf David S. Davenport, Depredation Methods and the Importance of Expectations:
Implications for Hwnan Capital, 54 TAX NOTES 1399, 1400-02 (1992) (asserting that
investing in higher education is analagous, risk-wise, to transactions involving royalties for
intangibles and mineral property).
10 GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPrrAL 198-200 (2d ed. 1975); Mark Blaug, The Rate
of Return on Investment in Education in Great Britain, MANCHESTER SCH. 205-51 (Sept.
1965), reprinted in MARK BLAUG, THE ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION AND THE EDUCATION OF
AN ECONOmIST, at 7 (1987) [hereinafter EDUCATION OF AN ECONOMIST]; Gary S. Becker,
Underinvestient in College Education?, 50 AM. ECON. REV. 346, 347-49 (1960); W. Lee
Hansen, Total and Private Rates of Return to Investments in Schooling, 71 1. PoL. ECON.
128 (1963); Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. Rnv. 1
(1961) (Schultz and Becker have been professors at the University of Chicago.). These
studies focus mainly on the private rate of return obtained by comparing net future
incremental wages with net private costs. But see Gordon K. Douglass, Economic Returns
on Investments in Higher Education, in HOwARD R. BOwEN ET AL., INVESTMENr IN
LEARNING 359, 374-75 (1977) (noting the private return on education dropped below that of
conventional assets in the early 1970s). There is also a "social" rate of return, obtained by
weighing social benefits (including incremental tax yields, but not increased net wages)
against governmental outlays, which is much harder to measure. The social return is said to
be less than the private return, although it is still quite high. See M. Woodhall, Human
Capital Concepts, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION: RESEARCH AND STUDIES 21, 22 (George
Psacharopoulos ed., 1987) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION].
1993]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
(higher) education as rational investors."l This notion is commonly referred to
as the "human capital hypothesis."
The human capital hypothesis has been subject to criticism and
qualification. 12 The basic analytical problem is that the correlation between
incremental education and incremental earnings does not establish that the
education was the cause of the incremental earnings. 13 The term "causation"
denotes several kinds of relationships. There are "sufficient" causes,
"necessary" causes, "but for" causes, and so on. Education cannot be a
sufficient cause of significant incremental earnings, because any job must be
actually practiced to produce wages. Nor would higher education be a
necessary cause of higher wages in any logical sense, because many persons
are able to obtain high earnings without higher education. Even granting that
higher wages are statistically associated with higher education, one should look
to what "causes" individuals to obtain higher education in the first place.
Because the opportunity to obtain higher education, especially beyond college,
is highly competitive, intellectual ability must be one factor. 14 Another would
be an environment (family background and resources) that allowed the
individual to forego current wages in order to obtain higher education.' 5 A
third would be personal traits (other than intellectual ability), including
11 See, e.g., RICHARD B. FREEMAN, THE MARKET FOR COLLEGE-TRAINED MANPOWER:
A STUDY IN THE ECONOMICS OF CAREER CHOIcE 1-15 (1971) (focusing on engineers and
scientists).
12 See Anita Manning, College Has Little Effect on Income, USA TODAY, July 13,
1992, at D1 (citing a Pennsylvania State University study showing that college and
vocational education yield a rate of return of only 6 % and 5 % respectively). See generally
ALAN J. DEYOUNG, ECONOMICS AND AMERICAN EDUCATION 127-34 (1989); Mark Blaug,
Book Review, 24 J. HUM. RESOURCES 331 (1989) (reviewing ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION,
supra note 10).
13 See generally M. Woodhall, Earnings and Education, in ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 209, 212-14 (stating education is the leading indicator of
earnings).
14 See Jere R. Behrman & Paul Taubman, Is Schooling "Mostly in the Genes"?
Nature-Nurture Decomposition Using Data on Relatives, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1425 (1989); see
also I. Fdgerlind, Ability: Effects on Earnings, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION, supra note 10,
at 285. But cf Zvi Griliches & William M. Mason, Education, Income, and Ability, 80 J.
POL. ECON. S74 (1972) (downplaying role of IQ in determining income).
15 CHRISTOPHER JENCKS ET AL., WHO GETS AHEAD? 81 (1979); Harvey Galper &
Robert M. Dunn, Jr., A Short-Run Demand Function for Higher Education in the United
States, 77 J. POL. ECON. 765, 767 (1969); cf. Mary Corcoran & Linda P. Datcher,
Intergenerational Status Transmission and the Process of Individual Attainment, in FIVE
THousAND AMERICAN FAMILIES-PATrERNS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS, 169-206 (Martha S.
Hill et al. eds., 1981) (stating that family background correlates more with schooling and
occupational status than future income, but ability is less correlated with income).
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appearance, 16 that motivate a person to take advantage of higher education
opportunities and help one to "succeed" in endeavors generally.' 7 A fourth
would be plain luck.18 But native ability, environment, personality, and luck
might produce higher earnings even without a higher education experience.
Statistical studies done by adherents of the human capital hypothesis
purporting to show that these other factors account for significantly less of the
incremental wage stream than does education 19 are not completely convincing.
Methodologically, statistical studies are incapable of showing what a person's
earnings would be in the absence of the last marginal educational attainment.
Empirically, the studies fail to account for the fact that persons within several
guild-monopoly-like professions, such as law, receive widely variable salaries
at any age level. 20 What the human capital hypothesis ultimately lacks is an
explanatory hypothesis, other than free-market dogma, that would illuminate
the statistical correlation.
To fill this theoretical lacuna, later commentators developed the
"screening" (or "credentialist") theory of the relation between education and
earnings. 2 ' This theory holds that employers favor educated workers not so
much for any specific knowledge or training acquired through the educational
program as such, but because successful completion of an educational program
is deemed by employers to be sufficient evidence of the requisite personality
traits, such as trainability, communications skills, versatility, ability to defer
gratification, ambition, time management skills, leadership ability, and social
skills.22 Conversely, failure to complete degree programs is indicative of
16 Cf Irene M. Frieze et a,., Perceived and Actual Discrimination in the Salaries of
Male and Female Managers, 20 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 46, 47 (1990) (stating that the
physical attractiveness of a job candidate influences whether he or she will get the job).17 JENCKS, supra note 15, at 230, 306.
8 CHRISTOPPHER JENCKS ET AL., INEQUALITY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF
FAmILY AND SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 227 (1972).
19 See, e.g., Woodhall, supra note 13, at 209, 212. The methodology used in arriving
at such a coefficient is attacked in Steven J. Klees, Planning and Policy Analysis in
Education: What Can Economics Tell Us?, 30 COMP. EDUC. REV. 574, 581-83 (1986).
20 See infra note 30.
21 The first five chapters of EDUCATION OF AN ECONOMIST, supra note 10, at 3-140,
reveal Psacharopoulos's progressive conversion to the screening theory.
22 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Higher Education as a Filter, 2 J. PUB. ECON. 193 (1973);
Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of "Screening," Education, and the Distribution of Income,
65 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 292-95 (1975); Lester C. Thurow, Measuring the Economic
Benefits of Education, in HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LABOR MARKET 373 (Margaret S.
Gordon ed., 1974). See generally Mark Blaug, 7he Empirical Status of Human Capital
Theory: A Slightly Jaundficed Survey, I. ECON. LITERATURE, Sept. 1976, at 827, reprinted
in EDUCATION OFAN ECONOMIST, supra note 10, at 100.
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negative traits.23 An empirical confirmation of the "credential" hypothesis is
the fact that the rate of return is significantly higher for the twelfth grade of
high school and for the senior year of college than for the immediately
preceding grades. 24
A sociological version of the screening theory asserts that the principal
function of higher education is to maintain an elite that appears to be open to all
on the basis of intellectual merit but in the main serves to perpetuate existing
class hierarchies.25
The screening theory somewhat finesses the causation problem inherent in
the human capital hypothesis: It is not necessary to inquire whether the
requisite traits that produce higher wages are "caused" by the higher education
or are simply revealed, or "filtered," through it.26 On the other hand, the
screening theory suggests the presence of an additional major "cause" of
incremental human capital, namely, specific job placement and on-the-job
training and socialization. In other words, educational attainment is just a.
"preliminary" screening device. Because desirable personality traits might exist
independently of higher education, the screening theory has the virtue of
implicitly challenging employer personnel policies that overvalue educational
credentials. The screening theory also poses a challenge to the mission and
social value of higher education. 27 In other words, it cannot simply be
assumed, uncritically, that more and more higher education is desirable. This
point is developed in Part I1.
23 Michael R. Olneck & Ki-Seok Kim, High School Completion and Men's Incomes:
An Apparent Anomaly, 62 Soc. OF EDuc. 193, 194 (1989). This thesis is borne out by the
fact that successful takers of the GED (high school equivalency exam) generally do not fare
as well in the job market as do those with high school diplomas. Although cognitive
knowledge and skills are about equal in the two groups, the GED option could be taken to
signal high risk as indicated by earlier failure, inability to function in a group of peers, and
lack of self-discipline, and similar shortcomings. See Iver Peterson, As More Earn
Equivalency Diploma, Its Value Is Debated, N.Y. TIEs, Oct. 21, 1992, at B10.
24 See Hansen, supra note 10, at 134. But see THOMAS J. KANE & CECILIA E. RousE,
LABOR MARKET RURNs Two- AND FOUR-YEAR COLLEGES: Is A CRDrr A CEDrr AND
DODEGREESMATrER? (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4268,
1993). Also, a subcategory of credential, good grades in college, is significantly correlated
with higher earnings. Estelle James et al., College Quality and Future Earnings: Where
Should You Send Your Odild to College?, 79 AM. ECON. REv. 247, 251 (1989).
25 See generally THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATIONAL ExPANsiON (Margaret S. Archer
ed., 1982). However, going to an elite private Eastern college, although positively
correlated with earnings, is a relatively weak indicator thereof compared to grades and
major. James et al., supra note 24, at 250-52. Of course, earnings itself is but one indicator
of elite status.
26 See D.R. Winder, Screening Models and Education, in EcONOMIcs OF EDUCAtION,
supra note 10, at 287.
27 See infra text accompanying notes 242-45.
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b. The Market in Higher Education
If the human-capital hypothesis is correct, the policy implication is that the
market in higher education is a free market with slight imperfections that only
needs to be rationalized further. Thus, for example, students should be financed
by loans rather than scholarships and grants, 28 and-more to the point-private
educational investment should be treated tax-wise in a way similar to
conventional investment. However, this policy approach appears naive when
one directly examines the market in higher education.
For starters, the human-capital studies show, at best, only an aggregate
competitive rate of private return.29 However, the labor market is far from
monolithic; rates of return on education both across and within various
occupations are not equal.30 Moreover, studies show diminishing marginal
economic returns for incremental education. 31 Unless these variable rates of
28 See Theodore W. Schultz, Investment in Human Capital, 51 AM. ECON. REV. 1,
14-15 (1961).
29 One methodological issue is whether the "private cost" of education should include
the "opportunity cost," i.e., foregone wages. Although conventional economic analysis
would take opportunity cost into account, e.g., Becker, supra note 10, at 347, the actual
opportunity cost of education is not as straightforward as one might assume. See Woodhall,
supra note 13, at 214-15. It cannot be assumed that one will find immediate gainful
employment if one does not attend college. See, e.g., Jacob Mincer, Labor Force
Participation and Unemployment: A Review of Recent Evidence, in PosPEmrrY AND
UNEMLOYE.Nr 99 (Robert A. Gordon & Margaret S. Gordon eds., 1966). In times of
relatively high unemployment, higher education serves a "parking" function. Also, a large
percentage of students either work part-time (or even full-time) or receive funds from
parents or both, which they otherwise would not have received if they had been working
full-time.
30 The distribution of law-practice income of members of the California State Bar,
working at least 35 hours per week, in 1990 was as follows: $200,000 or more, 12%;
$125,000 to $199,999, 13%; $100,000 to $124,999, 10%; $75,000 to $99,999, 19%;
$50,000 to $74,999, 26%; $25,000 to $49,999, 14%; and under $25,000, 4%. SRI
INTERNATIONAL, DEmoRAwHIc SURVEY OF THE STATE BAR OF CALFORNIA 47 (1991). The
median salary for architects in 1990 was $36,100; the middle 50% ranged from $27,100 to
$52,400; the top 10% earned more than $66,300-with some over $100,000-and the
bottom 10% earned less than $17,900. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULLETIN No. 2400, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK 74 (1992-93). For
physicians, the median earnings in 1990 were $130,000; 25% earned less than $90,000 and
25% earned more than $200,000. James W. Moser, Physician Earnings, 1981-1990, in
SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1992, 18-19 (Martin L.
Gonzalez ed., 1992). For dentistry, in 1990 the median was $80,000; 25% earned less than
$56,000 and 25% earned more than $115,000. AmERICAN DENTAL ASSOCIATION, THE 1991
SURVEY OF DENTAL PRACTICE 5-6 (1992).
31 See Hansen, supra note 10, at 134-35.
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return are a function of riskiness-which seems unlikely overall 32-significant
market imperfections are implicated. 33
Proponents of the human capital hypothesis are shy when it comes to
explaining the mechanisms by which prices and returns are correlated. An
examination of certain segments of the labor market for persons with
postsecondary education suggests that the high rate of return is a function of
market imperfections rather than a free market. Thus, business executives can
often dictate their own compensation levels. 34 Various professions are
compensated on a percentage basis rather than an hourly rate. The traditional
learned professions, such as law, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy, accountancy,
and architecture, restrict entry into the profession by various means, such as
licensing, and in some cases are shielded by law from competition by
nonlicenced persons. Some professions, such as academia, the civil service, the
priesthood, and certain skilled crafts, have obtained a high level of job security
in the form of tenure or its near equivalent in lieu of (or in addition to) high
wages. At least some professions have the ability to "create" demand for the
services they provide.35
In financial markets, prices (values) reflect expected future income streams
such that rates of return at given levels of risk (especially low levels) are fairly
constant. The higher education market is different. First, it is meaningless to
talk about the "value" of higher education, because, once acquired, it cannot be
bought and sold in any market. It is true that the human capital of any
3 2 Increased specialization resulting from incremental graduate, postgraduate, or
vocational education would seem to pose a greater risk of obsolescence, yet these forms of
education tend to show the lowest rates of return. On the other hand, certain categories of
employees (e.g., academics, clerics, civil servants) appear willing to trade possible higher
wages for increased job security.
33 See Blaug, supra note 22, at 107. For example, if there are too many graduate
students in the liberal arts, either the students lack adequate information about their career
prospects as Ph.D.s or else they subordinate their future wage scale to nonmonetary
considerations.
34 C. John A. Byrne, The lap Over Executive Pay, Bus. WK., May 6, 1991, at 90,
90-96.
35 In general, clients suffer a major informational disadvantage when dealing with the
learned professions and are in a difficult position to assess the competence of professional
individuals. See AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F. FELSTInER, LEGAL REALISM IN LAWYER-
CLIENT COMMUNICATIONS (American Bar Foundation Working Paper No. 8723, 1987);
Austin Sarat & William L.F. Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the
Divorce Lawyer's Office, 98 YALE L.J 1663, 1670-84 (1989) (noting lawyers present
themselves as savvy insiders in institutional power structure); see also Abraham S.
Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a
Profession, 1 LAw & Soc'y REv. 15 (1967), excerpted in AMEICAN COURT SYSTEMS 256
(Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 1989) (explaining how criminal justice institutions
and lawyers subsume interests of individual clients); infra notes 228-29.
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individual has a "rental value" (wage generating capacity) at any given
moment, but that value is contingent on many factors and qualities beside
education, especially as the date of graduation recedes. Looking, then, solely at
prices for higher education, it is hard to see how these prices could produce a
standard investment-type return from individual to individual.
Institutionally, the market in private education is riddled with
imperfections. Private institutions are heavily subsidized by tax benefits, 36
endowments, and public and private aid to (and subsidized loans for)
students.37 Supply is relatively unresponsive to short-ran fluctuations in
demand.38 Tuitions charged by private colleges seem to be highly correlated
with nonincome-enhancement factors such as geographical region, selective
admissions, and social prestige.39 Due to the inelasticity of supply, oligarchic
price-setting is the rule for the numerous selective private institutions; even
price-fixing appears to have occurred.40 Because the demand for nonselective
36 Gifts and scholarships are excluded from income, I.R.C. §§ 102(a) (1988), 117(a)-
(b) (Supp. Mf 1991), interest on loans secured by a second mortgage on a personal residence
and used for education is deductible, I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (Supp. III 1991), anended by 107
Stat. 312, 467 (1993), state and local income and property taxes are deductible, I.R.C.
§ 164(a) (1988), and contributions to educational institutions are deductible, I.R.C.
§ 170(a), (c) (Supp. 111 1991), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 455-56 (1993). The subsidy
component of higher education is not considered to be "income." See, e.g., McNulty, supra
note 2, at 24. Interest on state and local debt is excluded from income, I.R.C. § 103 (1988),
which has the effect of lowering the cost of debt issued by state and local governments to
finance education or students or both.
37 In 1968, tuition and fees accounted for less than 50% of educational costs in private
institutions. See Theodore W. Schultz, Optimal Investment in College Instruction: Equity
and Efficiency, 80 J. POL. ECON. S2, S3-$4 (1974); see also infra note 65-66.
38 Particular institutions do not expand and contract enrollment over the short run as
student demand waxes and wanes. From time to time, new institutions and programs may
appear, while others fall by the wayside, but this process lags far behind shifts in demand.
Moreover, a Harvard cannot be created overnight.
39 Harvard, Cornell, Vanderbilt, Colgate, Bennington, University of Chicago,
Northwestern, Wheaton, Tulane, Clark, Pine Manor, Kalamazoo, Stanford, Tufts,
University of Southern California, and Emory, for example, all charge between $18,000
and $21,550 (including tuition, fees, room, and board), despite widely varying prestige and
endowments (Duke is only slightly lower). Geography plays a role. Good private colleges in
Pennsylvania (Bucknell, Lafayette) tend to charge about $18,500. Their Virginia
counterparts (Randolph-Macon, Hollins, Washington & Lee, and Sweet Briar) are all
around $15,000. Their Texas counterparts (Rice, Southern Methodist, Texas Christian,
Baylor, Trinity, and Southwestern) are quite varied (but the variation might be explainable
by reference to endowment and religious affiliation). COLLEGE FAcrs CHART, 1990-91
(Marggi Roldan ed., 35th ed. 1990).
40 See Donald R. Carlson & George B. Shepherd, Cartel on Campus: The Economics
and Law of Academic Institutions Financial Aid Pfice-Fixing, 71 OR. L. REv. 563 (1992).
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private institutions is low, tuitions are low out of necessity, so that the
institutional resources are insufficient to provide a competitive educational
product.41 Certainly, it is rare to find price differentials among degree
programs within a given institution that would reflect possible differences in
future wage-stream potential. 42
The private cost of attending public institutions can hardly be set by a
"market," because tuition and fees are an output of the political process, which
takes into account tradition (or inertia), the self-interest of politicians, current
budgetary constraints, and sometimes the competition for prestige. Residents
and nonresidents receive the same education despite vastly disparate tuition
levels.
If incremental wages were indeed a function of the cost of higher
education, graduates of private colleges should be earning significantly higher
wages than graduates of public colleges of equal "quality," even after factoring
in opportunity CoStS. 43 Yet there is evidence that credentials (the degree, the
major, and grades) are usually more important than either the prestige of the
granting institution" or the "quality" of the educational program (per-student
expenditures). 45 And high-prestige public institutions charge far less tuition
than do many low-prestige private institutions. 46 Scholarship aid provided by
institutions, mostly based on financial need,47 operates as a form of price
See generally Steven R. Salbu, Building a Moat Around the Ivory Tower: Pricing Policy in
the Business of Higher Education, 75 MARQ. L. REV. 283 (1992).
41 Institutions facing declining demand cannot easily cut costs (or prices) due to the
sunk investment in plant and equipment and salary obligations to tenured faculty.
42 See generally D.W. Verry, University Internal Efficiency, in ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 65. For an indication of differences in starting salaries, see L.
PATRICK SCHEETZ, RECRUrING TRENDS 1988-89, 15-21 (Michigan State University 1988).
The University of Texas charges higher tuition at certain graduate professional schools than
for students in general. This differential is partly justified on the theory that professional
school students perceive their education as being motivated by personal gain. In fact, higher
and higher levels of education show ever-diminishing marginal rates of return. See supra
note 24 and infra note 240.
43 Also, persons paying nonresident tuition should earn more than those paying
resident tuition.
44 See JENcKs, supra note 15, at 295-96.
45 See BOWEN ET AL., supra note 10, at 239-43 (providing that little variation among
institutions in cognitive value added relative to abilities of incoming students); James et al.,
supra note 24, at 250-51 (providing that per student expenditures have insignificant effect
on student earnings, but prestige and selectivity of institution have some effect).
46 For example, in 1990-91, the University of California at Davis charged resident
tuition and fees of $1,701, whereas World College West charged $9,000. COLLEGE FACrs
CHART, supra note 39, at 10.
47 See CHRON. OFHIGHEREDUC., Aug. 28, 1991, at 3, 3.
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discrimination among students. Yet aid recipients receive the same education as
other students.
Finally, virtually all of the funds spent by students on higher education that
they obtained by way of family gift, scholarship, or loan is earmarked
exclusively for such purpose. One who spends "free" money would not seek a
market rate of return unless alternative market investments were readily
available, but they rarely are in the case of potential students.
c. The Conswnption Component of Higher Education
It is generally acknowledged that education produces utility beyond an
increase in future wages.48 This utility is traditionally called "consumption,"
and analytically takes two forms: (1) current consumption (knowledge for its
own sake, an organized social life, increased social status within the college-age
population, freedom from authority, avoidance of military service, cultural and
athletic opportunities, and freedom in general),49 and (2) deferred consumption
(more interesting work, a lifelong set of friends and contacts, higher social
status, ability to consume culture, and the like).50 Direct surveys show that
students are motivated to pursue college education not only by an unquantified
desire to achieve higher earnings but also by numerous other consumption-type
factors.51 It might also be significant that college students tend to change
majors away from math and science into those like social science and education
48 See, e.g., W.W. McMahon, Conswnption and Other Benefits of Education, in
ECONO&ICS OF EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 129; see also Edward T. Gullason, Te
Conswnption Value of Schooling: An Empirical Estimate of One Aspect, 24 J. HuM.
RESOURCES 287 (1989) (attempting to show that current-consumption value of education is
positive and is theoretically capable of measurement).
49 See infra note 51 (showing some strong nonmarket motivations for attending
college).
50 See RICHARD P. COLEMAN ET AL., SOCIAL STANDING IN AMERICA 65-78 (1978); see
also Alan D. Mathios, Education, Variation in Earnings, and Nonmonetary Compensation,
24 L HuM. REsouRcES 456 (1988) (providing that nonmonetary rewards increase with level
of education relative to monetary rewards). Interestingly, for educated people a sense of
well-being is significantly less correlated with income level than is the case with the
noneducated, suggesting that higher education (or associated family wealth) gives one an
option to pursue relatively low-paying but high-prestige, high-satisfaction occupations, or
highly-secure occupations like the ministry, education, the arts, public service, and so on,
or both of these types of occupations. See generally ANGUS CAMPBELL El AL., THE
QUALrY OF AMERICAN I (1976).
51 See ALExANDER W. AsTIN Er AL., THE AMERICAN FRESHMAN: NATIONAL NoRMS
FOR FALL 1990, 16 (1990).
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(which often offer lower future earnings potential), rather than the other way
around.52
It has been estimated that the consumption value of education approaches
equality with the future-earnings value.53 If so, and if the price of higher
education correlates with the investment return alone, then higher education is
an extraordinary bargain-obviously because of public (governmental) and
quasi-public (charitable) subsidies.54 But, it is arbitrary, from the policy point
of view, to "allocate" the private cost of education entirely to the investment
return while (implicitly) matching the consumption component to the public
cost. If this method of allocation were taken seriously, there would be virtually
no policy justification for government subsidies to higher education or students.
Yet the proponents of amortization of educational costs are, in effect, asking
for an additional government subsidy.
d. Do Prospective Students Act Like Rational Investors?
Although students often are influenced by the returns from education, it
hardly appears that they act like sophisticated investors. 55 Surveys of college
students indicate that future earnings, in a general sort of way, are strongly
considered by many, but by no means all, students, but that various other
"consumption" factors are given considerable weight;56 also, future earnings
appear to be viewed (irrationally) mainly in terms of starting salaries as
opposed to lifetime earnings curves.57 One study indicates that college students
exaggerate the impact of college on their own future income levels. 58 Persons
from poor and uneducated backgrounds generally undervalue investment in
higher education relative to cost (including opportunity cost);59 in some cases
they may simply lack the minimal funds necessary to make the investment. No
52 RIcHARD B. McKENzIE & ROBERT J. STAAF, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF LEARNING
30(1974).
53 Robert H. Haveman & Barbara L. Wolfe, Schooling and Economic Well-Being: 7The
Role ofNonmarket Effects, 19 J. HUM. RESOuRCEs 377, 379 (1984).
54 See, e.g., SUBSIDIES TO HIGHER EDUCATION 24 (Howard P. Tuckman & Edward
Whalen eds., 1980).
55 Schultz, supra note 37, at S23, argues that students are sensitive to returns on the
basis of the observation that talented people in the 1960s had abandoned pursuing careers in
education in favor of law and business. Other factors in this shift must be the civil rights and
women's movements, plus the decline in the nonnonetary rewards from teaching.
56 See AsTIN TAL., supra note 51, at 16.
57 See J.K. Hinchliffe, Education and the Labour Market, in ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 141, 144 (criticizing FREEMAN, supra note 11, for not
making this distinction in his study).
58 Herbert L. Smith & Brian Powell, Great Expectations: Variations in Income
Expectations among College Seniors, 63 Soc. OFEDUc. 194, 204-06 (1990).
59 Becker, supra note 10, at 353.
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study known to me has found that students actually (1) compare the future
earning stream derived from higher education with what they would have
earned without the higher education, (2) discount these earning streams to the
present, and (3) compare the incremental income stream with the private cost of
the higher education (including current wages foregone) or any combination
thereof.60 Most prospective students are lacking in the basic skills of financial
analysis.
To sum up, although it is not surprising that higher education correlates
somewhat with incremental earnings (and even more so with increased status),
the proposition that the price of higher education is a function of "investment"
return in a free market defies logic and observation, especially on an individual
basis. The higher education scene, not to mention labor markets in the
professions, lack many of the characteristics of a free market, and whatever
market exists does not solely pertain to an "investment." It follows that
conclusions relating to such a relatively minor issue as the tax treatment of
costs of higher education cannot simply be obtained by logical deduction from
free-market economic principles.
2. Alleged Inferior Market Status of Educational Investment
The neutrality argument for amortization of higher education costs
postulates that education is at a disadvantage compared to conventional
investments. This assertion is, of course, directly contradicted by the human-
capital hypothesis. Indeed, if the private cost of education yields a market rate
of return comparable to conventional investments, and if substantial
consumption returns are also produced, it follows that the total return on the
private cost of education substantially exceeds that for conventional
investments.
3. Refining the Neutrality Norm
Neutrality is hardly an absolute: "Optimal taxation" theory posits that
facial nonneutrality is sometimes inconsequential, 61 and "second best" theory
60 See Hinchliffe, supra note 57, at 144-45 (stating empirical evidence does not
confirm that demand for education is a function of "investment" return).
61 Optimal taxation theory is founded on the insight that economic distortions are a
function of elasticity. Thus, higher taxes can be imposed on inelastic commodities (such as
existence, death, and penicillin) rather than on elastic ones, because the higher taxes on the
inelastic commodities will not alter consumer choices and thereby create allocative
inefficiencies. See generally Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the
Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1945-65
(1987); Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. EcoN. PBRsP. 157
(1990).
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dictates that existing tax nonneutralities should not necessarily be
"COrrected."62
Optimal taxation theory holds that nonneutral tax rules are harmless where
there is a low degree of elasticity (substitutability) between alternative
investments. The principal substitute "investments" for higher education are
entering the labor force, joining the military, and enjoying leisure (through
continued parental support). The making of conventional investments is rarely
an available option. Most higher education is undertaken by people in their late
teens and early twenties without substantial capital of their own and little or no
investment expertise. Parents will spend large sums for their children's higher
education-indeed, it may even constitute required "support" under state
law63-but not be willing to make gifts of cash or securities. 64 Massive
government-backed loan programs are targeted exclusively for education. 65
Students would not be able to readily obtain education loans in an unsubsidized
private capital market, because they cannot pledge themselves (their future
wages) as collateral. Scholarship funds and direct student aid are inherently
committed to educational purposes.66 Even for students owning capital,
parental and peer pressure, not to mention the consumption benefits obtainable
through education, might outweigh investment considerations. No study that I
62 Removing a tax nonneutrality may actually aggravate allocative inefficiencies in a
context of other, nontax, nonneutralities. See generally R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The
General Theory ofthe Second Best, 24 REv. EcoN. STUD. 11 (1956).
63 See Annotation, Responsibility of Noncustodial Divorced Parent To Pay for, or
Contribute to, Costs of Chid's College Education, 99 A.L.R.3D 322 (1980).
64 Twenty percent of undergraduates ages 18 to 22 are (apparently) wholly parent
financed. John Elson, COmpus of the Future, TIME, April 13, 1992, at 54, 55. About 80%
of students from well-off families receive parental assistance; for middle-income and poor
students the figures are 70% and 40% respectively. THOMAS G. MORTENSON, THE IMPACT
OF INCREmED LoAN UTILIZATION AMONG Low FAMILY INcOME STUDENTS 5 (ACT Student
Financial Aid Research Report Series No. 90-1). For 1989-1990, it has been estimated that
the aggregate national college bill was $67.5 billion, of which $38.4 billion was not
attributable to student aid (including federal loan programs). ROBERT LEIDER & ANNA
LEIDER, LovEjoy's GUIDE TO FINANciAL AID 14 (3d ed. 1989). Virtually all of this $38.4
billion must derive either from family support or from wage income. Gifts of tuition and
college expenses would not show up in the data for federal gift tax returns because of the
exclusion for direct payments of tuition (§ 2503(e)), the $10,000 annual exclusion
(§ 2503(b)), and the (nonstatutory) exclusion for "support." I.R.C. § 2503 (Supp. IBI 1991).
65 Government-backed education loans awarded in the 1989-1990 academic year
amounted to $12.4 billion. LEIDER & LEIDER, supra note 64, at 14.
66 For 1990, state and federal student aid totalled about $6.7 billion dollars. CHRON.
Op HIGHER EDUC., supra note 47, at 3. Another source comes up with $9 billion. LEMER &
LEIDER, supra note 64, at 14-15. State and federal educational subsidies to institutions are
not included in these figures. Scholarship aid provided by institutions (including tuition
remission) and other private sources was $5.7 billion in 1989-1990. Id. at 15-16.
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am aware of purports to demonstrate that there is any significant elasticity
between investment in education and conventional investment, and the
proponents of amortization offer no empirical evidence that an amortization
deduction would significantly affect the behavior of potential students. People
from poorer backgrounds lacking the desire or means to pursue higher
education would need much more than a deferred tax benefit in the form of
amortization deduction to render higher education a viable option.
67
Even if elasticity existed, according to the theory of the second best an
additional tax benefit for higher education would not improve allocative
efficiency, given the existing "tilt" in the playing field in favor of higher
education.
B. Horizontal Equity
Horizontal equity is sometimes invoked as an argument for amortization
(or current deduction) of outlays for higher education.68 Horizontal equity is an
ethical maxim that posits that persons in the same position should be taxed the
same.
1. Equal Investors?
One commentator offers the following hypothetical as an argument that
failure to amortize education costs is inequitable (and nonneutral): Three
brothers have $10,000 to invest. The choice is among (1) investing in
appreciating stock (the investor), (2) investing in depreciable equipment (the
entrepreneur), and (3) investing in career-oriented education for one year (the
scientist), each of which investment yielded $30,000 gross (before taxes) after
three years. 69 Because the third alternative produces the worst tax results, 70 it
is asserted that the tax system treats the student inequitably.
Initially, there are some problems with the hypothetical itself. First, as
pointed out immediately above, it is unrealistic in assuming that would-be
students are commonly dealt a cash endowment that can be freely spent on any
of the three specified choices; in the vast majority of cases, only the education
option is available. Second, the investor and entrepreneur have their after-tax
dollars available to reinvest in the same activity. The student's education, in
contrast, has allowed her to enter a profession (science) and to remain in it
indefinitely; she does not have to start over again (go back to school or apply
67 See infra text accompanying notes 209-15.
68 See, e.g., Davenport I, supra note 1, at 802; Lebowitz, supra note 1, at 826.
69 See Lebowitz, supra note 1, at 825.
70 The gross wages are taxed, with no basis offset or amortization deductions.
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for a licence) every three years.71 Third, conventional investment and human
capital "cause" income in different ways. A financial investment generates
income as a matter of contract right; the owner is purely passive. Productive
investment (equipment, and the like) resembles human capital in that it must be
combined with personal effort and skill to produce income. But the personal
effort and skill can be provided by parties other than the party who supplies the
productive investment; ultimately, the supplier of investment need only be a
manager of personnel. In any event, if the productive investment is poorly
used, it will be acquired by those who can make better use of it-which leads
to the fourth point, which is that human capital, unlike investment and
productive capital, is not transferable. 72 Fifth, if the price of education includes
significant present or future consumption value or both, the purchaser of
education is only partly an investor. Sixth, as pointed out above in connection
with the human capital hypothesis, the tax discrimination, if any, is
inconsequential, because the cost of education after taxes is still a bargain
relative to conventional investments.
One should not also have to make the obvious point that, if indeed there
were an efficient market in education purely as an investment, there could not
be any inequity: The tax regime for human capital outlays would have been
factored into the rate of return on human capital, so that the after-tax rate of
return for investments in human capital would be comparable to after-tax rates
of return on investment capital. 73 In that case, the numbers in the hypothetical
posing three alternative investment choices would be incorrect. 74
2. Equity with Respect to the Financing of Education
A different form of horizontal equity argument relates to the means by
which a student may finance higher education. Specifically, self-financed
education is alleged to be at a tax disadvantage compared to gift-based and
71 Continuing education requires neither the cash outlay nor the opportunity cost of
initial education.
72 A contract for personal services cannot be enforced by specific performance; even
damages are hard to obtain. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE
INMUY RULE 168-72 (1991). See generally Stewart E. Sterk, Restraints on Alienation of
Human Capital, 79 VA. L. REV. 383 (1993). Although there is a labor market in which
employers may attempt to create and deploy human capital, that endeavor is analytically
distinct from that of individuals acquiring human capital for their own benefit.
73 See Boris I. Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and Income Tax 77ory: Do Misallocations
Drive Out Inequities?, in THE ECONOMICS OF TAXATION 23 (Henry J. Aaron & Michael I.
Boskin eds., 1980).
74 But, although there would be "equity," there would also be a misallocation of
resources. See JOSEPH M. DODGE, THE LOGIC OF TAX 293-95 (1989).
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scholarship-based education.75 Debt-financed education lies somewhere in
between: In general the interest is not deductible, unless the borrowing is
secured by a (second) mortgage on a personal residence.76
A basic problem with the horizontal equity argument is that it is based on
the idea that one or more tax breaks, accepted as "given," command another
tax break. The horizontal equity line of argument typically leads to the worst
possible kind of tax system. As a matter of logic, horizontal equity concerns
can be redressed as well by removing tax breaks as it can by extending them.
On the merits, the scholarship exclusion seems to be basically sound,
because scholarships functionally operate as selective price discounts.7 7 Even if
the discounted price is viewed as being less than the value of what is received,
arms-length bargain purchases of conswnption should, as I have argued
elsewhere, not be viewed as "gross income," because the taxpayer commands
economic resources that can be sacrificed to government only in an amount
equal to the amount spent (not the "value") of the consumption item.78
Assuming that bargain purchases of assets should generate income, education is
more like consumption than an asset, because neither the education nor the
resulting enhancement of human capital can be realized upon currently.79
In any event, any amortization deduction would presumably be limited to
the after-scholarship cost of education to the student.80 Otherwise, the policy of
section 265(a)(1) would be violated and write-offs would be generated by
before-tax dollars.81 This observation raises the issue of whether amortization
deductions should be available for education financed by excludible gifts and
bequests. Amortization should not be allowed, at least in principle, in those
75 See Davenport I, supra note 1, at 802.
76 LR.C. § 163(h)(3) (Supp. I 1991), arended by 107 Stat. 312, 467 (1993).
77 See generally Charlotte Crane, Sdwlarships and the Federal Income Tax Base, 28
HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 63, 69-74 (1991); Joseph M. Dodge, Scholarslps Under the Income
Tax, 46 TAX LAw. 697 (1993).
78 Joseph M. Dodge, Zarin v. Commissioner: Musings About Debt Cancellations and
"Consunption" in an Income Tax Base, 45 TAx L. REv. 677, 680-81 (1990); see Alan
Gunn, Another Look at the Zarin Case, 50 TAx NoTEs 893, 893-95 (1991). See generally
Thomas Chancellor, Imputed Income and the Ideal Income Tax, 67 OR. L. Rnv. 561
(1988); Daniel I. Halperin, Valuing Personal Conswnption.. Cost Versus Value and the
Impact ofInsurance, 1 FLA. TAXREv. 1 (1992).
79Cf LR.C. § 83(a) (Supp. I1 1991) (receipt by employee of forfeitable and
nontransferrable property is not gross income).
80 See Manocchio v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 989 (1982), affid, 710 F.2d 1400 (9th
Cir. 1983) (holding no deduction for tuition that generated a tax-exempt scholarship).
81 The argument might be made that such a rule would have the effect of negating the
scholarship exclusion. Crane, supra note 77, at 83 n.55. This is not the case at all. The
exclusion would be maintained, but a deduction presupposes that the taxpayer has incurred
some net cost.
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cases where the education directly "caused" the gift.82 Because the causal link
between gift and education would be much harder to sort out on a case-by-case
basis than would be the case with scholarships, it would be necessary to rely on
some "formal" rule, such as: (1) no amortization only where the donor directly
pays the educational bills, (2) amortization in all gift-financed cases, or (3) no
amortization in any gift-financed case. Alternative (1) could be easily
circumvented. In choosing between alternatives (2) and (3), a principled
advocate of horizontal equity would choose the latter.83
It can be argued that the gift exclusion is merely an income-attribution rule
that allocates income to the donor rather than the donee so as to preserve the
integrity of the progressive rate schedule. 84 Despite attribution of the income to
the donor, it is then said to be proper that the donee obtain the amortization
deduction, in order to properly "match" the outlay to the donee's future wage
income.8 5 The problem with this analysis is that the donee has not incurred any
net "cost," but only an economic wash. The parent is the one who has incurred
the cost in fact, and because the parent is also treated as the owner of the
income, so should the parent be treated as having incurred the cost for tax
purposes. The assignment-of-income doctrine supports this conclusion, at least
in the case of strings-attached gifts. 86 Admittedly, current doctrine allows a
82 Deductions and basis are not disallowed just because a taxpayer uses a tax-exempt
source to make the payment in question. In the policy sense, the issue is, then, "What kind
of (causal) relationship between the receipt and the outlay should be deemed sufficient to
trigger a disallowance rule?" Cf I.R.C. § 265(a)(2) (Supp. I1 1991) (weak causal nexus for
interest expense connected with exempt § 103 interest).
83 Cf. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.117-6(c)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 21688 (1988) (scholarship
exclusion not dependent upon tracing).
84 This argument assumes the illegitimacy of taxing both the donor and the donee. See
Alvin Warren, Would a Conswnphion Tax Be Fairer 77an an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J.
1081, 1088 (1980). I would argue, however, that from an ability-to-pay perspective, both
parties have command of the same wealth during the same period, and both should be
taxed. See Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform. Including Gifts and
Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1177 (1978). To say that both donor and donee are
treated as part of the same taxable unit is just a fancy way of stating the effect of section
102; it is not a rationale for section 102. Why should donor and donee be treated as part of
the same taxable unit with respect to gifts (and bequests?) in the context of a tax system that
generally treats each individual as a separate taxpayer? The argument that the subject of
gifts is "shared" between the donor and donee, see GOODE, supra note 2, at 99, is both
factually inaccurate and normatively irrelevant. "Support" in kind, as distinguished from
gifts, is properly taxed to the provider, who is the person solely in control of the resources.
The fact that another person enjoys the resources is irrelevant from an ability-to-pay
approach.
85 See Argrett, supra note 1, at 655.
86 In Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), the owner of a coupon bond made
annual gifts of current coupons to his son. The Court held that the coupon interest was
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donee to generally treat the subject of a gift, when expended, as representing a
cost incurred by the donee.87 Extending this rule to allow amortization of gift-
financed education, while continuing to disallow amortization of scholarship-
financed education, would overwhelmingly favor the offspring of the upper
classes. But the rule for gift-financed expenditures is only based on
administrative convenience, namely, the fungibility of cash and resulting
difficulty of tracing gratuitous receipts to particular expenditures by the donee.
This obstacle is not insuperable; in fact, the same argument was made for
maintaining the deduction for personal interest, but Congress rejected it in 1986
by enacting a rule that personal interest is not generally deductible,8 8 and the
U.S. Treasury has implemented this command by promulgating a tracing
rule.89 In the case at hand, an alternative to a tracing rule would be a
"stacking" rule that attributed educational outlays "first" to gratuitous transfers
received. Regardless of the practical concerns, the "matching" concept adds
absolutely nothing to that of "cost" or "loss." Indeed, the matching theory only
subverts the amortization argument for gift-financed education, because parents
are not the owners of their children's future wage streams. 90
In the case of a below-market educational loan, which is a bargain purchase
of money, the gain is clearly realized in the year of borrowing, economically-
speaking.91 But because the gain on the borrowing is linked to the purchase of
education, it can be viewed simply as another form of excludible scholarship. 92
As for at-market educational loans, the case for deducting interest must be
the alleged connection of the education to future income; if the cost of
education should be recovered, so should related interest expense, but not if the
cost of education is not recoverable. Being able to deduct interest on personal
taxed to the donor rather than the donee. The best rationale for Horst is that the donor
controlled the enjoyment of the coupon income. Similarly, in the case of support or strings-
attached gifts, the donor controls the expenditure, for which he or she receives no
deduction.87 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1988) (donor's basis carries over to donee).
88 See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1) (Supp. 111 1991), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 467 (1993)
(personal interest not deductible).
89 Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-8T(a)(3) (1987).
90 Even where the opposite is the case (in some states) for wage incomes of minor
children, the income tax law treats the income as that of the child. I.R.C. § 73 (1988).
91 Below-market educational loans to students apparently do not trigger I.R.C. § 7872
(1988), which focuses mainly on related-party and tax-avoidance loans. See § 7872(c). Even
if such a loan generated income to the student, it is conceivable that the benefit would be
excluded under LR.C. § 117 (West Supp. 1993) in whole or in part.
92 It would also be excludible as government welfare. In theory, the subsidy could be
taxed and the amount of the subsidy increased to cover the tax liability of poor students.
Because most students are poor in the income tax sense (gifts, scholarships, and subsidies
being excludible), includibility can be dispensed with as an administrative shortcut.
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loans just because the loan is secured by a second mortgage on a personal
residence is without justification; only the propertied classes benefit.
C. Haig-Simons Income
The Haig-Simons definition of income as consumption plus net increases in
wealth is routinely invoked in tax policy discussion. The discussion below
demonstrates that the Haig-Simons income concept can only detract from the
quality of the analysis.
1. Why Haig-Simons Income?
The Haig-Simons income concept is not self-validating; serious policy
issues cannot be resolved by manipulating definitions. One must ask, "Why is
Haig-Simons income a plausible norm for the tax base?" Aside from the
Constitution,93 the main underpinnings of the Haig-Simons income concept are
the norms of ability to pay and neutrality.
a. Ability to Pay
The Haig-Simons income concept is partly validated under the ability-to-
pay norm,94 under which the ethical obligation of citizens to contribute to the
reallocative and redistributive functions of government is a function of the
material resources (money and property) they respectively control during a
given budget period. A "pure" ability-to-pay tax base would encompass the
value of material wealth held at the end of the year plus personal consumption
during the year. The Haig-Simons income concept modifies the wealth
component for neutrality reasons, as will be pointed out shortly, but otherwise
it strongly resembles an ability-to-pay tax base. An ability-to-pay tax would
allow deductions off the "bottom" for subsistence (or quasi-subsistence) living
93 An unapportioned federal wealth tax would be unconstitutional, see U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3, whereas an income tax is allowed, U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI. The
Constitution is not an obstacle to the present scheme of taxing human capital. Refusal of a
taxpayer to include wages fully in gross income on the ground that all or a part of them
represent a "return of capital" is criminal tax fraud. E.g., United States v. Sassak, 881 F.2d
276 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Thibodeaux, 758 F.2d 199 (7th Cir. 1985).
94 Historically, the Haig-Simons concept was promoted as an alternative to other
competing definitions of income, such as those that depended on the fruit-tree metaphor, the
recurring-receipts idea, or the notion of carving up national income. See generally SIMONS,
supra note 5, at 59-102. Simons himself appears to have been motivated more from
concerns of equity and redistribution than from neutrality per se. See id. at 41-43.
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expenses and make some concessions to liquidity concerns, 95 and in these
respects an ability-to-pay tax actually closer to the present income tax than is
the Haig-Simons income concept.96
Henry Simons himself opposed write-offs for human-capital acquisition
costs. 9 7 Although the private acquisition of human capital may create economic
value to society, income taxation is not founded on concepts of national wealth
but rather on the relative command of material resources by individuals. 98
Educational outlays do not create wealth that can be alienated or exchanged. 99
Although it is possible to think of wages as "rent" from the "use" of human
capital, the human capital itself can never be bought and sold; the value of it
can only be revealed in its actual practice or use.100 Accordingly, the value of
95 See DODGE, supra note 74, at 91-101. The ability-to-pay norm is neither universally
accepted nor always understood. Thus, some commentators view "personal income" as
being a person's share of the national income "pie." See, e.g., Norman H. Lane, A Theory
of the Tax Base: The Exchange Model, 3 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 1, 5-40 (1984); Warren, supra
note 84. Such a concept, if embodying fairness criteria at all, is incompatible with the
ability-to-pay concept. For example, transfers received are ignored under the "pie"
approach but are included in an ability-to-pay tax base. It is clear that Henry Simons
rejected the pie approach, see SMIONS, supra note 5, at 207, and followed the ability-to-pay
approach, because, inter alia, he proposed including gratuitous receipts in income.
96 The present income tax does not consider imputed income to be "income," and
gains and losses are generally taken into account only when "realized" or "sustained."
I.R.C. § 165(a) (1988), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 485 (1993); I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1988),
amended by 107 Stat. 312, 340 (1993). Various deductions "off the bottom" include the
standard deduction, I.R.C. § 63(c) (Supp. 11 1991), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 459 (1993),
the deduction for personal and dependency exemptions, I.R.C. § 151(a), (c) (West Supp.
1993), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 459 (1993), the deduction for medical expenses, I.R.C.
§ 213 (Supp. 1111991), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 435 (1993), the deduction for alimony
payments, I.R.C. § 215 (1988), and possibly the deductions for business travel lodging,
state and local income and property taxes, personal casualty losses, and moving expenses,
I.R.C. § 162(a)(2) (West Supp. 1993), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 435 (1993), I.R.C.
§ 164(a) (1988), I.R.C. § 165(c)(3), ch. 7 (1988), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 485 (1993),
and I.R.C. § 217 (Supp. H1 1991), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 473 (1993).
97 See infra note 102.
98 See supra notes 94-95.
99 Alvin C. Warren, Comments by Alvin C. Warren, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED:
INCOME OR EXPENDrrURE? 124-25 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980).
100 See Davenport I, supra note 1, at 846-48. Note that this result potentially violates
the neutrality norm, because conventional investment assets are normally included in gross
income when acquired. See I.R.C. § 74 (1988) (prizes), I.R.C. § 83 (Supp. 111 1991)
(property received for services). Nontransferability is not a per se ground for exclusion
from the tax base. Thus, under § 83(a) the receipt of property by a services provider is
income even though the property is not transferable. (Inclusion is prevented here only if a
transferee would take subject to conditions of forfeiture.) See § 83(c)(2). In the section 83
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any accession to human capital, such as the incremental value of one's future
wage stream acquired through higher education, would not be included in the
tax base, because it cannot be meaningfully realized upon until the wage stream
actually materializes. Similarly, no amortization deductions would be allowed,
because the process of earning wages would not entail a decrease in the value
of realizable-upon "wealth." Because amounts spent to acquire human capital
no longer inhere in exchangeable assets, 10 1 they are "destroyed" at the time the
outlays are incurred, and therefore, they constitute "personal consumption" as
Simons conceived it.102
Thus, although the human capital hypothesis suggests that educational
outlays are at least in part a capital expenditure, if the resulting asset (human
capital) is ignored for tax purposes, the educational outlay should be treated as
an expense! Because outlays of cash manifest the command by the taxpayer of
material resources, the ability-to-pay norm dictates that the outlay be
nondeductible unless there is a good (economic or distributional) reason to
deduct it.
A plausible case can be made for the proposition that parents should be
able to deduct educational outlays according to the ability-to-pay concept of
"nondiscretionary expenditures." 103 The argument would be that parental
support for at least college (if not graduate) education is both extraordinary in
amount and "compelled" either by law or convention. Defining and identifying
nondiscretionary outlays entails the exercise of social and political judgment,
which can be viewed as either a strength or a weakness of this approach. 1°4
situation the employee would bargain to receive illiquid assets only if illiquidity to pay taxes
is not a major concern. Accessions to human capital are on a far more pervasive scale.
101 The fact that knowledge and other personal characteristics can be "passed on" by
teachers, parents, and so on, does not mean that they are transferred, because the teacher,
parent, and others give up nothing. "Replicated" is a more accurate word, but even that
misses the mark, because whatever is passed on is reconstituted by the "transferee" in the
latter's own personhood and actions.
.102 See SMIONS, supra note 5, at 50, 54.
103 See 3 REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMIssIoN ON TAXATION 1-24 (1966) (Can.). The
notion of subsistence and nondiscretionary expenses is typically used to justify the personal
and dependency exemptions, the standard deduction, the medical expense deduction, the
deduction for state and local taxes, and the deduction for alimony. See DODGE, supra note
74, at 122-29; Thomas D. Griffiths, Theories of Personal Deductions in the Income Tax, 40
HASTINGS LJ. 343 (1989); see also William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal
Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 331-43 (1972) (discussing medical expense
deduction); William J. Turnier, Evaluating Personal Deductions in an Income Tax-7
Ideal, 66 CORNELLL. REv. 262, 288-93 (1981) (discussing state and local taxes).
104 See, e.g., Boris L Bittker, Income Tax Reform in Canada: The Report of the Royal
Conmission on Taxation, 35 U. Cmu. L. REv. 637, 658-59 (1968); Walter J. Blum,
Progressive Taxation Reconsidered-North of the Border, 45 TAXES 718 (1967); Joel S.
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The fact that something is widely valued does not make the cost of it
nondiscretionary; otherwise, desires would be too readily converted into
"necessities" and then into "rights." 10 5 Also, one might balk at allowing an
expense whose "nondiscretionariness" increases as one ascends the social
ladder.
Allowing a deduction to parents would be inconsistent with allowing any
tax write-offs to their children for gift-financed education. 1°6 Clearly the
student cannot invoke the nondiscretionary-outlay concept; the student must
invoke other norms.
b. Neutrality
The Haig-Simons income concept is a compromise between the ability-to-
pay and neutrality norms, which are inherently in tension. On the macro level,
while ability-to-pay posits that the tax base be constituted with reference to all
material resources over which the taxpayer has control (indicating a wealth
tax), neutrality dictates that the material resources of a taxpayer not be taxed
over and over again. Accordingly, under an income tax, given dollars of wealth
are only taxed once regardless of how many years the dollars are held by the
taxpayer. But neutrality itself is challenged by the theories of optimal taxation
and the second best.L0 7 Thus, on the micro-tax policy level, opinions can differ
as to how far ability-to-pay should go to accommodate economic policy criteria
as well as other criteria such as distributional concerns and, perhaps,
administrative convenience. 10 8
Because the causal connection between educational outlays and incremental
wages may be weak or nonexistent in particular instances, it can be assumed
that disallowing amortization would result, at worst, in something less than
double taxation in the aggregate. Over-taxation of the same human-capital
dollars is only harmful, from the allocative efficiency point of view, if it results
in under-investment in human capital relative to other competing uses of funds.
This proposition seems doubtful for the reasons stated earlier. 109
Newman, The Deductability of Nondiscretionary Personal Expenses, 6 AM. J. TAX PoL'Y
211 (1987).
105 An example of this kind of thinking can be found in Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical
Foundations for a Right to Education Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End
of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 550 (1992).
106 If the rationale for the gift exclusion is that the subject of a gift should be taxed
only once within the family unit, it would be inconsistent with this rationale to allow write-
offs to both the donor and the donee with respect to the same expenditures.107 See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
108 Most obviously, the goal of maximizing aggregate social wealth is generally
incompatible with that of achieving an equitable distribution of wealth and opportunities.
109 See supra pp. 930-43.
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Human capital extends beyond education to include items such as genetic
endowment, family and social environment, gifts, bequests, support,
scholarships, government aid, being hired, being promoted, and acquiring
seniority or tenure. Overall, it seems likely that human capital is treated as well
or better under the tax system than is investment capital: 110 Except for
nondeductible self-financed costs of education, human capital is mostly
acquired tax-free. The exclusions for these accessions to human capital can be
justified on various grounds, such as universality (birth, compulsory
schooling),111 impossibility of valuation,112 the inability to "realize upon" the
accession,- and the high value placed upon personal autonomy.113 In any event,
an exclusion is the equivalent of a deduction,114 and the deduction of
investment is the financial equivalent of exempting all future income; in
contrast, conventional investment income is, in the financial sense, "taxed
twice" under an income tax, even with capital recovery.1 15
As noted earlier, 116 even if human capital were viewed as being treated
worse than investment capital, the error would be "harmless," because there is
little elasticity between human capital and investment capital. Indeed, the
amortization proposal is itself nonneutral with respect to alternative means of
acquiring human capital. Only costs of higher education would be favored;
110 McNulty, supra note 2, at 22-26; L.G. Sgontz, Does the Income Tax Favor
Hunan Capital?, 35 NAT'L TAX J. 99, 103 (1982); Paul B. Stephan III, Federal Income
Taxation and Hunan Capital, 70 VA. L. REV. 1357, 1371-72, 1409-10 (1984). This point
has nothing to do with the exclusion of the opportunity cost of acquiring education
(foregone earnings). See Argrett, supra note 1, at 626-27. Opportunity cost is ignored by
the tax system. The opportunity cost of education is probably substantially overrated in any
event, see supra note 29.
111 Because the function of the tax base is to allocate the aggregate personal income
tax burden among the population in accordance with a quantitative index, it is pointless to
include in the tax base positive items that all taxpayers share (or have access to) equally,
such as life, oxygen, and basic government services.
112 See JOSEPH T. SNEED, Trn CONIouRATioNs OF GROSS INcoME 41-49 (1967);
DODGE, supra note 74, at 136-37.
113 See, e.g., Alan Gunn, The Casefor an Income Tax, 46 U. Cm. L. REv. 370, 382-
83 (1979); Warren, supra note 99, at 124-25.
114 The treatment of human capital accessions is the functional equivalent of including
them in income and taking an offsetting deduction in full.
115 The nondeductible cost of an investment represents the present discounted value of
all future cash flows, principal, and income. Because the income is taxed when accrued or
received, this income portion is taxed twice. See, e.g., DODGE, supra note 74, at 220-21.
116 See supra text accompanying notes 63-67.
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other costs pertaining to human capital, many of which are not difficult to
identify,' 17 would be ignored.
2. What Is Consumption?
Arguments about whether outlays for higher education constitute
consumption, which should not produce tax benefits, ultimately lead nowhere,
because the idea of "consumption" is itself subordinate to such "higher" norms
as ability-to-pay and allocative efficiency. The essence of the concept of income
(as opposed to that of wealth) is that the "same" dollars are not taxed twice nor
deducted twice. Basis recovery prevents the same dollars from being taxed
twice where the initial outlay was a nondeductible capital expenditure. An
"expense" is conventionally defined as an outlay that produces no ascertainable
future benefit that lasts beyond the current year. Nevertheless, the concept of
"expense" is somewhat of a fiction; at least business and investment expenses
are made with the aim of producing present or future income.118 Of course,
income represents the same dollars as an expense in only a loose sense: It is
(usually) impossible to match a given expense item to a given income item. The
same point can be made about depreciation and losses with respect to physical
assets. 119
The weak causal link between gross income, on the one hand, and business
expenses, depreciation, and losses, on the other, is the reason why the latter are
prima facie deductible. 120 But the tax law must be-and is-skeptical in
situations where outlays might be ends in themselves rather than means to the
end of producing incremental revenue. 121 Expenses, depreciation, and losses
117 Some other outlays relating to the acquisition of human capital are job-seeking
expenses, moving expenses, continuing education outlays, and health-oriented expenses. See
infra text accompanying notes 171-93.
1 18 Bua cf. William A. Klein, Income Taxation and Commuting Expenses: Tax Policy
and tie Need for Nonsimplistic Analysis of "Simple" Problems, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 871
(1969); William A. Klein, Tax Deductions for Family Care Expenses, 14 B.C. INDUs. &
COM. L. REV. 917 (1973) (basing equity and neutrality analysis on likely motivations of
typical taxpayers).
119 A financial instrument like an annuity or debt obligation provides for a return as a
matter of contract. Even shares of stock commonly entail a claim against net worth upon
liquidation.
120 For the same reason, net operating loss carryovers are appropriate as a matter of
principle. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 492-94 (1943) (holding recovery of
prior loss not producing tax benefit is excludable), implicitly ovemding Burnet v. Sanford &
Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 364 (1931) (denying loss carryover); see also DODGE, supra
note 74, at 25-27.
121 See section 162(a)(2) (business travel meals and lodging not involving overnight
stay) and the following provisions of LR.C. section 274 (Supp. III 1991), amended by 107
Stat. 312, 469 (1993): (a) (additional hurdles for deducting business entertainment outlays),
1993]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
(i.e., "consumption") that are ends in themselves must be taxed then or never,
because they do not create future income. This broad concept of consumption
differs from the conventional view that consumption is identified by personal
utility. One point of difference is that the broad view of consumption
encompasses wanton or predictable economic waste. 122
In a clear business setting, the tax system relies on the taxpayer's business
judgment (and the judgment of the business community) in deciding what is
income related. 123 In borderline cases, however, the system allows deductions
to the extent of the gross income only; the outlays are deemed to have
"caused" the gross income, but the net losses are deemed not to have caused
any (current or future) income and are therefore permanently disallowed. 124
This "objective" method of line-drawing explains why personal pleasure or
utility is only a "factor" in considering nondeductibility; pleasure by itself is
(properly) never sufficient to deny deductibility. 125
Where does this causal-nexus theory of business deductions lead in the case
of costs of higher education? On the one hand, if education really does create
or improve human capital (wage-earning capacity), the cost of it arguably
should be recovered in full, notwithstanding the acknowledged substantial
pleasure component. 126 More precisely, to the extent that education correlates
with incremental human capital, cost recovery should be allowed against
incremental income attributable to the education. 127
Moreover, that education might possess a dual investment-consumption
character does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that an allocation of cost
between the two is proper. 128 An allocation would be in order only where it
(q) (foreign business travel), (h) (foreign conventions, conventions aboard cruise ships, and
"investment" seminars), (k), (n) (business meals and entertainment), (I) (entertainment
tickets and skyboxes), (m) (luxury water transportation; travel as form of education). See
also LR.C. § 280F (Supp. 1111991) (luxury automobiles, other vehicles, computers, and
cellular telephones used in business).
122 Net losses from nonpleasure activities that generate wanton economic waste are not
deductible. E.g., Surloffv. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 210 (1983). Under ability-to-pay, these
losses, as well as losses on consumer assets, represent economic resources commanded by
the taxpayer during the year and not devoted to income-producing activity.
123 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 112-14 (1933) (construing "necessary" and
"ordinary" under I.R.C. § 162 (West Supp. 1993)).
124 See § 183 (not-for-profit activities) and I.R.C. § 280A (1988) (business use of
home).
125 See supra note 122.
126 See supra text accompanying note 120.
127 This more narrow rule raises technical problems of implementation. For example,
should the write-off be altered or denied if the incremental human-capital income is
accelerated (by way of "signing" bonuses), deferred, or simply lies fallow?
128 H. alperin, supra note 2, at 862-63, 886 (providing that in theory, only excess
of outlay over consumption value is a business expense); William A. Klein, The
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could be shown that the private cost of education exceeded the value of the
incremental future wage stream, because this excess would necessarily
represent consumption. However, there is insufficient evidence at the present
to support any allocation to consumption on this basis.1 29 Others have argued
that the investment component of an outlay is the excess of cost over its
consumption value. 130 Although it is probably easier to value the consumption
component directly as opposed to the investment component in some areas,
such as business meals and entertainment, in principle, if investment return can
be identified, it should crowd out consumption, because "income" essentially
means avoidance of double taxation, not taxing utility as such. 131
The foregoing analysis does not clinch the issue in a situation, such as that
involving higher education, where the combined consumption-investment value
exceeds the private cost due to heavy public and quasi-public investment. There
is no principled basis for saying that the investment return should be matched
to the private cost-leaving the consumption return to be allocated to the public
cost-but neither is there a principled basis for taking the opposite approach.
It is obvious that taxpayers cannot be allowed to plead that human-capital
outlays are business-motivated on a case-by-case basis. The administrative
burden would be intolerable, and taxpayers' testimony would be self-serving
and unreliable. 132 It follows that some clear-cut rule, even if arbitrary, is
Deductability of Transportation Expenses of a Combination Business and Pleasure Trip-A
Conceptual Analysis, 18 STAN. L. REv. 1099, 1104-18 (1966) (discussing causation-based
rules and allocation rules).
129 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
130 See, e.g., Halperin, supra note 2, at 862-63.
131 Although certain tax rules (such as the rate structure and the personal exemptions)
may be founded on utility concerns, it does not follow that the object of taxation is to tax
utility as such, because utility is not capable of interpersonal comparison and is not
apprehendable by the government. Thus, it is erroneous to assume that the value of leisure
or self-provided services should be included in the tax base, although "neutrality"
considerations may point the other way. See Chancellor, supra note 78, at 593-601; Dodge,
supra note 78, at 680-83; see also Daniel Shaviro, 7he Man Who Lost Too Much. Zarin v.
Commissioner and the Measurement of Taxable Consunption, 45 TAx L. REv. 215, 251-
52 (1990) (rejecting utility-based tax-base rules due to practical considerations). But cf.
Andrews, supra note 103, at 331-43 (suggesting that medical expenses are properly
deductible because they produce no utility above a baseline of normality); Michael J.
McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified
Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1573, 1592-99 (1977) justifying joint-return system
because spouses share enjoyment of family income). Of course, income-attribution issues
are typically resolved according to control, not enjoyment, of economic resources. See,
e.g., §§ 73, 102(a); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 119 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford,
309 U.S. 331, 334-35 (1940); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 112 (1930).
132 Surveys indicate that students tend to overrate the effect of education on their own
earnings. See supra note 58.
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necessary. Given that tax "justice" is not at all possible in this area, economic
(and other normative) considerations should ultimately control. Decisive is the
fact that the no-double-taxation principle inherent in the Haig-Simons income
concept is ultimately grounded in the concept of neutrality, which itself-as
mentioned earlier-is not an "absolute" in the realm of economics. Thus, for
the reasons stated earlier (and later), amortization cannot be justified. If the
resulting categorization of human-capital outlays as "personal" is viewed as a
mere concession to "administrability," so are other major structural decisions
in the income tax, 133 suggesting that perhaps there is a point at which
administrability concerns rise to the status of "principle."
Nor can a convincing case be made for singling out professional or
vocational education or both for favorable tax treatment. 134 Although it is
commonly thought that prospects for higher income are typically the dominant
motive here, 135 three problems persist. First, returns on education do not
increase as one moves up the educational ladder;136 nor does it appear that
vocational education is generally a sound investment. 137 Second, the desire to
acquire a trade or profession is as much or more likely to relate to lifestyle and
status than to incremental income.138 Third, under standard capitalization
doctrine all steps in the acquisition of an asset must be capitalized, not just the
last step. 139 Would the proponents of amortization of professional and
133 The realization principle, depreciation schedules, the failure to index for inflation,
and (perhaps) the exclusion of imputed income from consumer goods are commonly
attributed largely to administrability concerns, although this explanation may not be fully
adequate. For example, it has been argued that not taxing imputed income is justified on
fairness grounds. See Chancellor, supra note 78, at 598-600. The standard deduction and
the floors under miscellaneous itemized deductions, the medical expense deduction, and the
personal casualty loss deduction are other examples.
134 Cf. Halperin, supra note 2, at 904 (providing that the cost of this education, but not
college education, should be amortized, because the former presumably has minimal
consumption aspects).
135 It is generally assumed that the consumption component of education decreases as
one progresses through the system, being at its lowest in professional and vocational school.
E.g., Alan Gunn, The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure Create or Enhance an Asset,
15 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. REv. 443, 479-80 (1974); Lebowitz, supra note 1, at 827-28;
McNulty, supra note 2, at 18-19 (expressing some uncertainty).
136 See Hansen, supra note 10.
13 7 See GEORGE PSACHAROPOULOs, RETURNS TO EDUCATION: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON 5, 71-72 (1973) (Neth.) (detailing cross-cultural comparison of vocational-
technical versus general education).
138 See supra note 50.
139 E.g., Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 575 (1970); Sun Co. & Subs. v.
Commissioner, 677 F.2d 294 (3d Cir. 1982). In Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515
(1976), aff'dper curimn, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979),
the court disallowed the cost of taking a bar review course, while allowing amortization of
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vocational education really want to go so far as to allow amortization of the
cost of all education, from birth forward, in the name of "perfecting the
definition of income"? 140
The foregoing discussion of the consumption issue, which actually was
"slanted" in favor of the case for amortization, does not really add anything to
what was stated before, for the simple reason that the consumption concept
itself adds nothing to the key norms of ability-to-pay and allocative efficiency.
This point reinforces the prior point that the Haig-Simons income concept has
no independent value in tax policy analysis.
3. A "Consumption" Income Tax
Further light on the human capital issue might be shed by an examination
of the treatment of human capital under a "consumption income tax." Under
the "cash flow" version of the consumption income tax, all receipts (including
borrowings and sales proceeds) are fully included in the tax base but all
business and investment outlays, including capital expenditures, are fully and
currently deductible. Under the alternative "wage" tax version, wage income is
fully includible, business and investment capital expenditures are not deducted,
but all business and investment positive cash flows are exempt from tax. 141
These two versions are conceptual equivalents to each other in the business and
investment realm, because the cash-flow method of including all cash flows
while deducting the investment is the financial (i.e., present value) equivalent
of the wage-tax method of not deducting the investments but exempting the
cash flows. 142 There would be differences in their actual applications: 143 The
cash flow version would be considered more "fair" because the tax base would
be keyed to actual investment outcomes, 144 whereas the wage tax would be
the cost of gaining admission to the bar, on the ground that the bar review course was
"education," not a cost of obtaining the license. This reasoning is simply conclusory.
140 From both an equity and neutrality perspective, compulsory education should not
enter into the tax base, because it is a universal attribute of taxpayers. Therefore, it cannot
be a basis for comparing taxpayers, nor has the resource-allocation issue been left open.
141 That is, business and investment income and gains are fully excluded. See
generally, U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., BLUEPRINTS FoR BAsIc TAX REFoRM 9-12 (1977).
142 Becase the cost of an investment is the present value of future cash flows, it does
not matter, ex ante, whether one deducts the investment or excludes the cash flows from
income.
143 Actual cash flows may differ from the cash flows represented in the purchase
price. Thus, a wage tax produces a better result for an investor than the cash flow tax where
actual cash flows exceed the projections thereof embodied in the initial price.
144 Actual cash receipts, whether wages, income, sales proceeds, or borrowings, are
included in the cash flow tax base, whereas under the wage tax, business and investment net
income and gains are ignored.
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more "neutral" because equal-priced investments would be taxed the same ex
ante.1
45
Under both versions of the consumption tax, there would be no deduction
for educational outlays (or any other human capital acquisition costs) and no
(full or partial) exclusion of wage income. 146 It is axiomatic that under the
wage-tax version gross wage income would be fully subject to tax. Even under
the cash flow version, gross wage income would be subject to tax sooner or
later. 147
The chief appeal of the consumption tax is that it is "more" neutral both
between consumption and investments and among conventional investments
than is the income tax, because the consumption tax avoids the financial
"double taxation" of conventional investment income that occurs under the
income tax. 14 8 Neutrality between conventional investments and human capital
investments is simply not an issue. From a lifetime perspective, "conswnption"
is equated with gross wage income.149
If gross wages are taxed under a consumption tax, it must mean gross
wages are fully taxed under an income tax. 10 An income tax base is broader
than a consumption tax base, of course; it includes changes in material
145 Investments costing the same would be taxed the same by virtue of disallowing any
deductions with respect to the purchase price and ignoring actual cash flows.
146 See U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., BLUEPRINTs FOR BASIC TAX REFORM, at 55, 116, 143
n.1 (1977).
147 Wages would not be fully taxed when received, to the extent committed to business
and investment outlays, but the cash flows produced by these outlays would be fully taxed.
Although not all investments will have been reduced to cash by death, the date-of-death
value of such investments should be taxed by reason of death. A subissue is whether this
wealth should be taxed to the transferor or to the transferee. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS.,
BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsIc TAX REFORM, at 137 (1977) (stating recipient should be taxed);
Dodge, supra note 84, at 1187 (providing that transfers should be taxed to transferor under
cash flow tax analogue to the tax benefit rule, the idea being that the original deduction for
the investment was premised on eventual taxation to the investor); Michael J. Graetz,
Expenditure Tax Design, in WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDrruRE?, at 161,
200-02 (Joseph A. Pechman ed., 1980).
148 This income is taxed ex ante (wage tax) or ex post (cash flow tax), but not both at
the front and back end. See David Bradford, The Case for a Personal Consznption Tax, in
WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE?, at 75, 96-101 (Joseph A. Pechman,
ed., 1980). Under the income tax, the nondeductibility of the purchase price as a capital
expenditure is the "first" tax, because the purchase price is the present discounted value of
all future receipts, principal, and income; the income is taxed again when received or
accrued.
149 The statement in the text holds true, under the cash flow tax, only if gratuitous
transfers are taxed to the transferors, not the transferees. See supra note 147.
150 See U.S. DEP'T OFTREAs., BLUEPRINTS FORBASIC TAX REFORM, at 54-55 (1977).
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wealth. 151 All of the rules of the income tax (other than those relating to
personal deductions, among others) are simply "accounting" rules pertaining to
the measurement of conventional business and investment income from year to
year. In any given year, income may be more or less than gross wages, but
(disregarding personal deductions, among others, plus deductions derived from
gifts) 152 lifetime income can never (normatively) be less than gross wage
income. Thus, "lifetime" Haig-Simons income can be described as "gross
wage income plus other net accessions to wealth." The "consumption" idea is
again superfluous.153
4. Taxation of Hwnan Capital
In conformity with Simons's theorizing, the tax law ignores both
accessions to, and losses of, human capital. 154 The call for amortization of the
151 If one invests $10,000 (the present value of all fature cash flows from the $10,000)
and receives $17,000 in cash over the future life of the asset, $7,000 is "income."
Recovery-of-capital rules tell us which part of the $17,000 is "income" and which part is
"principal," and when this is the case.
152 If, following Henry Simons, gratuitous receipts were included in income, this
exception would disappear.
153 See Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAxL. Rnv. 283, 308-10
(1990) (arguing that, because all savings are eventually consumed, the core of the income
taxation is ultimately consumption); Calvin H. Johnson, Soft Money Investing Under the
Income Tax, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 1019, 1062-63 (1989). Accumulated wealth entails
more than future consumption: it yields power, status, financial security, and flexibility.
Although the utility derived from these benefits is not included as such in the tax base, their
presence can plausibly lead to the view that savings should not be wholly exempt from tax.
See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Tme Preference and Tax Equity, 35 STAN. L. REv. 649, 658-60
(1983); Jeff Stmad, Periodicy and Accretion Taxation: Nonnrs and Implementation, 99 YALE
L.J. 1817, 1832-39 (1990). See generally Warren, supra note 99. The proposition that
savings is future consumption is misleading in two ways. First, it ignores waste and value
depreciation. Second, savings is not necessarily converted to consumption by the same
taxpayer or even a succession of related taxpayers. The income tax focuses on individuals
rather than family trees. Simply defining "consumption" to encompass the making of
gratuitous transfers will not suffice.
154 1 disagree with Paul Stephan, supra note 110, at 1387-1405, who argues that the
current tax system takes human capital into account in several instances. For example, the
notion that medical expenses are deductible as a "repair" to human capital is rebutted by the
design of the section 213 deduction itself- the deduction is available with respect to illnesses
and conditions that do not impair human capital, and the 7.5%-of-AGI "floor" under the
deduction has no counterpart for normal repair deductions. The deduction, including the
floor, can better be rationalized on the ground that extraordinary amounts of such expenses
are, in the main, nondiscretionary and above the norm, which is accounted for by the
standard deduction, personal exemption, and lower marginal rate brackets. See DODGE,
supra note 74, at 122-29; cf Andrews, supra note 103, at 335-37 (noting deduction
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cost of any category of education raises a slippery slope problem, because
virtually any outlay (including one relating to personal appearance, socializing,
entertainment, and family) can arguably improve wage-earning capacity. An
income tax base would be feeble indeed if borderline human-capital situations
were systematically treated as being business-related. It is proper for current
law to treat them as "personal." 155
Human capital is not analogous to situations involving alternating business
and personal use over time or in space, which mandate allocations between
business and personal use. 156 Rather, human capital, Janus-like, simultaneously
presents business and personal "faces." Human capital pertains not only to
income-producing capacity but also to the ability to enjoy both life and work
more broadly and fully. As the saying goes, "Do people work to live, or do
people live to work?" 157 Even focusing on employment, obtaining higher (or
vocational) education enables one to earn a living in a certain way or at least
expands one's employment options. Choosing one way of making a living over
another is essentially a personal choice, an end in itself (consumption, if you
insist), rather than a means to an end. 158 Career decisions, like marriage and
home-buying decisions, are pervasive to how everyday life is lived, and should
be categorized as "personal." 159 Finally, education is not a money machine; it
restores taxpayer to the norm). The maintenance of good health is viewed in economics
literature as one mode of human capital acquisition. See BECKER, supra note 10, at 40-41.
Nevertheless, general health maintenance costs are not deductible under section 162 or
section 213 and are simply ignored by the tax system. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1) (1957)
(as amended in 1979). Although the I.R.C. section 104 (Supp. 1 1991) exclusion is
commonly rationalized under a "replacement of capital" theory, consistency with that
rationale would dictate deduction of uncompensated loss. For an alternate rationale for
excluding recoveries for lost human capital, see Joseph M. Dodge, Taxes and Tots, 77
CORNELL L. Ray. 143 (1992). As for job-search expenses and moving expenses, see infra
notes 181-91 and accompanying text.
155 Fifty percent of business meals and entertainment are disallowed under section
274(n). See also section 280F(d)(3), which disallows any deduction for employee use of
"listed property" except where the use is a condition of employment and for the
convenience of the employer. These rules operate in the context of outlays that the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) concedes to be primarily business motivated or for which case-by-
case enforcement would be too difficult.
156 For example, use of a car or home for part-personal and part-business use
generates deductions keyed to the percentage of business use.
157 SIMoNs, supra note 5, at 74 (citing 39 Finanz Arcdv 408-11 (Georg Schanz ed.,
1921) (Germany)).
158 See Rev. Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 C.B. 63 (providing that outlays for general search
for, or preliminary investigation of, business or investment are "personal").
159 This seems to be Justice Cardozo's main point in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933). See also U.S. DEP'T OF TREAs., BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsIc TAX REFORM, at 55
(1977) (noting choice of occupation, place of residence, and place of employment are all
"personal"); Alan Gunn, supra note 135, at 477-80. Under section 104, the fact that a
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must be combined with such purely personal attributes of the individual as
motivation, personality, ability, and (above all) the taxpayer's time and effort to
realize its nontransferable potential. 160
D. Other Issues Involving Hwnan Capital
1. How Would Hwnan Capital Be Written Off?
Assuming that higher education costs should be amortized at all, it might
be argued that a short useful life would be proper on the theory that knowledge
and technical skills become obsolete and therefore are short-lived. 161 However,
the factual and legal predicates for this argument are debatable. Standard
capitalization doctrine, which holds that depreciation deductions on an asset
used to acquire, create, or construct other assets is capitalized to such other
assets, 162 would appear to apply in this case, given that education is itself but
one component of the more inclusive asset of human capital.163 What counts is
a person's capacity to combine knowledge with skills, motivation, and effort to
generate wages. The process of acquiring and manipulating even obsolete
knowledge renders subsequent learning, practice, and wage-earning easier,
more efficient, and more useful.' 64 The content of knowledge is possibly not
even a component of human capital, because it is available in libraries.
given plaintiff suffered a loss of income-earning capacity indicates that the injury was
"personal." E.g., Roemer v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 693 (9th Cir. 1983).
160 Various characteristics of human capital are set forth in T.W. Schultz, Education
and Population Quality, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 11, 12. Although
an entrepreneur derives return both from conventional capital investment and human-capital
capital investment, the tax system does not usually have to segregate the two. But cf.
§ 162(a)(1) (corporations can deduct reasonable salary but not disguised return on
investment capital) and I.R.C. § 911(a) (1988) (exclusion for foreign source "earned
income" of a U.S. taxpayer; income from a business in which capital is a material income-
producing factor is not "earned income").
161 Lebowitz, supra note 1, at 830 (analogizing educational expenses to start-up costs
under I.R.C. § 195 (1988)).
162 I.R.C. § 263A(a)-(b) (Supp. 111 1991); Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418
U.S. 1, 10-13 (1974).
163 Depreciation of the separate components of human capital would not make any
sense, because the components have no meaningful existence apart from the whole, and
neither the components nor the whole can be alienated. Cf. Calvin Johnson, Component
Depreciation in the Purchase of Businesses, 58 TAx NOTES 983, 985 (1993) (letter to the
editor).
164 Education paves the way for further education and training. See Hinchliffe, supra
note 57, at 141, 143.
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The proponents of accelerated amortization would have the burden of
justifying it. 165 But invoking the "matching" concept of accounting is of no
avail, because depreciation in taxation is keyed instead to "loss." 166 Nor does
amortization follow from attempting to characterize educational outlays as an
"investment." The student does not directly purchase the right to any future
income stream. 167 The screening theory of (higher) education suggests a useful
165 I do not concur with Professor Davenport's suggestion, see Davenport, supra note
9, at 406-08, that accelerated depreciation is proper where the future income stream is
speculative. Depending on how the particular speculative investment plays out, the
depreciation formula may misstate the net income in either direction. However, there is no
a priori reason to favor a generous depreciation schedule. The currently accepted method of
dealing with speculative intangible investments is under the income-forecast method, under
which the depreciation is a function of current net income, and where the depreciation
formula is subject to adjustment for significant changes in the expected future income
stream, e.g., Rev. Rul. 89-62, 1989-1 C.B. 78. In theory, an ex post depreciation system,
with interest adjustments to compensate for inaccuracies in the ex ante system, could be
designed. In any event, investments in human capital are not particularly risky or
speculative. A taxpayer's stock of human capital is not to be equated with a particular job,
from which the taxpayer may be severed. The human capital is intact, and, short of death or
disability (which are subject to actuarial calculation), it is capable of being exercised. Nor
does the possibility that the taxpayer may decline to exercise her human capital lead to a
contrary conclusion. Failure to exercise one's human capital, or being laid off, does not
create a tax loss any more than does the occurrence of a vacancy in rental property or a
self-inflicted casualty. See § 165(h)(4)(E); Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941). Only
passage-of-time losses generate depreciation deductions under a "realization" income tax.
166 See Joseph M. Dodge, Normative Depreciation Run into the Ground, 54 TAx
NOas 1567, 1568 (1992) (letter to the editor).
167 Thus, Professor Davenport's invocation of "Kahn depreciation," see Davenport I,
supra note 1, at 889-904, is misguided. Briefly, Kahn depreciation is accelerated because-
and contrary to the overwhelming weight of scholarly opinion-it would ignore the passage-
of-time increase in value of future receipts as they arrive closer to realization. See Douglas
A. Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or a Proper Allowance for Measuring
Net Income?, 78 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1979). The Kahn model, at best, would only apply to
financial investments, where it can plausibly be argued that the purchase price can be
"allocated" to discrete future receipts. It can have no application to investment in human
capital, because there is no purchase of any future receipts. See also Yishai Beer, Toward
Extension of the Option Tax Legislation: From Option 'In Personam'to Option.'In Rem, '58
TAX NOTES 1097 (1993) (viewing professional education as an option to make future
investments). Mr. Beer then argues that the student should be able to amortize the series of
options. However, Beer's analysis presupposes the ability to distinguish between the
personal and investment components of education, id. at 1107, whereas my position is that
such bifurcation is impossible both factually and conceptually. See supra text accompanying
notes 128-31. Moreover, Beer's option model presupposes a corresponding income
inclusion by the seller of the investment, but in the human-capital area such sellers are
typically tax exempt entities. In the absense of the discipline that would be imposed by such
inclusion, the concept of "cost" would have to be narrowly limited in order to preclude the
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life equal to the person's remaining life expectancy, which is the useful life of
credentials in general. 168 And, insofar as credentials are "signs" of underlying
(positive) personality attributes, which are normally expected to improve with
age, decelerated depreciation is indicated. 169 In fact, outside of a few
professions, persons with high educational credentials enjoy substantial
increases in earnings with age.
2. Are Degrees Separate and Distinct Assets?
Although the credentialist theory of educational investment might be cited
in support of the contention that degrees are assets (like licences) separate from
the person, degrees should be treated as human capital, because (1) degrees,
although capable of being "bought," cannot be sold, and (2) the degree yields
incremental income only in conjunction with the other components of human
capital. 17
0
3. Deductions for Employment-Related Expenses
Present law currently allows employment-related deductions where (1) the
outlay is considered an "expense," and the taxpayer is already engaged in the
business of being an employee or (2) the outlay creates a depreciable or
amortizable asset related to the taxpayer's business of being an employee. 171
Deductions that relate to the earning of wages should not be categorically
disallowed, as such a rule would place services businesses at a disadvantage
compared to capital-intensive ones. However, outlays that involve the
acquisition of human capital should not generate tax write-offs. 172 Several
borderline categories will now be examined.
marketing of human capital as a tax shelter. Finally, Beer fails to demonstrate that
accurately measuring income from human capital along the lines suggested would be good
policy.
168 See supra note 22.
169 See Gross, supra note 1, at 936-37.
170 But cf Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1681-83
(1993) (holding that a taxpayer could allocate part of the cost of acquiring newspapers to an
amortizable intangible called "paid subscribers" apart from nonamortizable goodwill). Basis
and capital recovery inhere in all business assets, but do not inhere in human capital, which
is personal. Thus, isolating a component of human capital does not lead to amortization.
171 See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (as amended in 1967); Sharon v. Commissioner 66
T.C. 515 (1976), aff'dper cuiamn, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S.
941 (1979); Cremona v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 219 (1972), acq., 1975-2 C.B. 1.
172 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933); Denman v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.
439, 445 (1967), acq., 1968-2 C.B. 2.
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a. Professional Licences and Fees
Although taxpayers have succeeded in amortizing the bare cost of
professional licences, 173 this result would seem to stand on no stronger a
footing than amortization of degrees. The essential difference between human
capital and business capital is that the former cannot be alienated and the latter
can be.' 74 This inalienability is inherent in human capital, and is not self-
imposed by contract or otherwise for the purpose of tax avoidance.' 75
According to this test, most professional licences such as bar admissions,
medical specialty licences, CPA licences, and so on, would be treated as a
nondeductible component of human capital.
Bar dues (for example), whether prepaid or paid annually, are
distinguishable from licences, because the dues "purchase" various services
provided to the legal profession and its members, including self-regulation. The
fact that in some states the payment of bar dues is mandatory to maintain one's
licence is not dispositive. Simply because it is expedient to "tax" attorneys on a
universal basis to cope with the free-rider problem does not mean that bar dues
purchase human capital.
b. Continuing Education
The regulations allow a deduction for educational costs where the
education maintains or improves one's skills in an existing trade or business or
to meet specific requests of an employer for additional education beyond the
minimum required for employment. 176 These regulations are obviously
modeled on the distinction between Improvements and repairs: Improvements
(acquisition costs of human capital) are neither deductible nor amortizable,
whereas repairs are currently-deductible business expenses.
The idea that repairs to assets are "expenses" is highly suspect177 under the
general principle that outlays that have value beyond the current period are
173 Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 525-27 (1976), affdper cuiam, 591 F.2d
1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979).
174 See Bateman v. United States, 490 F.2d 549, 554-57 (9th Cir. 1973) (Wright, I.,
dissenting).
175 Historically, taxpayers have argued that nontransferability of property precludes
inclusion of the property in gross income. See, e.g., United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d
863 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821 (1950). This issue was essentially put to rest by
the enactment of section 83 in 1969. Avoiding income by restrictions on transferability has
too much tax-avoidance potential to be tolerated. Also, it results in the mismeasurement of
income. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. Tax avoidance is not a problem with
human capital; nonalienability cannot be avoided.
176 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(c)(1) (as amended in 1967).
177 See johnson, supra note 153, at 1086-89.
[Vol. 54:927
TAX & HIGHER EDUCATION
capital expenditures.1 78 Continuing education does not maintain existing
knowledge and skills-it is not some kind of technique for enhancing recall-
rather, it involves new knowledge; therefore, it would generally satisfy the
basic capitalization principle; this is the case also with conventional repairs,
like a paint job.
But what should the cost of continuing education be capitalized to? Most
continuing education involves learning information that is available in
published materials. In general, the cost of acquiring a library should be
capitalized and amortized, although the regulations allow current expensing of
the same by an individual on a de minimis basis. 179 Information that is
generally available can be treated as being separate from human capital, and the
cost of obtaining it should be treated accordingly.
One might distinguish (1) education that involves intensive skill training,
(2) education that one must obtain in order to acquire or maintain one's
occupational status, and (3) education that involves a potential change in
occupation, because it is plausible to treat these categories as being allocable to
human capital. However, making distinctions of this sort may not be worth the
effort. An easy-to-administer test would be to disallow the cost of all degree
programs; this test would achieve the desired results in most cases.
c. Job-Seeking and Moving Outlays
Under present caselaw, job-seeking outlays are deductible if the job being
sought falls within the "same" trade or business as the taxpayer's current
employment, on the basis of an analysis that is essentially the same as that
involved in connection with continuing education courses.180 Moving
"expenses" are currently deductible under § 217,181 provided only that certain
conditions relating to full-time employment at the new locale are met and that
the move is not within the same narrow geographical area.182
An economist would say that both job-seeking and moving ("migration")
outlays are human capital acquisition costs. 183 However, the tax law need not
go so far. The fact that these outlays relate to the future does establish that they
178 INDOPCO v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1044-45 (1992).
179 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6 (1958) (professionals). Otherwise, the first $10,000 of
investment in tangible business assets can be expensed. See I.R.C. § 179 (Supp. I1 1991),
awended by 107 Stat. 312, 432 (1993).
180 Cremona v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 219 (1972), acq., 1975-1 C.B. 1; see also
Rev. Rul. 78-93, 1978-1 C.B. 38.
181 See section 217(b), which defines moving expenses to include costs of moving the
taxpayer, the taxpayer's family, and personal effects to the new residence.
182 See § 217(a), (c). The taxpayer need not have previously been employed, and the
new job need not be in the same line of work as the old job.
183 See BECKER, supra note 10, at 39-40; Woodhall, supra note 10, at 24.
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are capital expenditures, but are they to be capitalized to "human capital" in the
tax sense (wage-earning capacity of the person) or to some intangible asset
apart from the person, such as the job itself?. A particular employment does not
necessarily increase the income-producing capacity of the person, nor does it
embody a life-style choice in the same way that choosing a profession does; the
job only allows the taxpayer's human capital to be deployed at a specified time
and place and in a certain manner.18 4 Although the employee cannot usually
sell the job, upon leaving the job, the latter typically reverts to the labor
market. Thus, although the issue presents a close call, one could reasonably
conclude that a particular employment position is more like an alienable licence
than like human capital. 185
Following the job-as-asset approach, the cost of a successful job search
would be a conventional business capital expenditure. The result should not
hinge on whether the new job is in the taxpayer's same line of business as the
old job, or even whether it is the taxpayer's first job.
A technical problem would be to determine the useful life of the asset in
question, that is, the job, because it cannot be predicted in any given case how
long it will be held. An asset without an ascertainable useful life cannot be
amortized, even if it is known that the asset does not have an infinite useful
life.' 86 It would not be unreasonable to amortize the costs over the remaining
period until expected retirement (age 65 or 70), while allowing a loss equal to
the unamortized basis in case the job is prematurely lost. 187 On the other hand,
it can be argued that the unamortized costs of the old job should be
recapitalized to any new job acquired, on the theory that obtaining any given
job is typically a function (in part) of previous positions held. Perhaps a
legislative compromise solution is called for here.188
Although some moves are undoubtedly job-related, many are undoubtedly
motivated by lifestyle choices. Although, in theory, moving expenses that are
incidental to obtaining a job could be capitalized to the job, in practice it would
often be difficult to determine whether the move or the job was "primary."
Another problem is that the useful lives of moving costs and job-seeking costs
can differ: A series of jobs may be obtained in the new location; likewise, a
given job may persist through several moves. The foregoing suggests that
184 See Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 381 (1970), acq. in result, 1972-2
C.B. 2.
185 C. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962) (holding that the
surrender of movie rights back to the copyright holder who re-assigned the rights to a third
party is treated as a "sale").
186 See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (as amended in 1960) (citing goodwill).
187 Cy Treas. Reg. § 15a.453-1(c)(3) (1981) (im installment sale with contingent selling
price, amortize basis of sold property over maximum period over which payments can be
received).
188 Cyl § 195 (five-year amortization of business start-up costs).
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moving costs should be eligible for current or future write-off, as job-seeking
expenses, only if (1) the taxpayer continues to be employed by the same
employer or (2) the new job yields a significant (say, five percent) salary
increase relative to the former job or both. 189
The case of costs of an unsuccessfid job search raises issues similar to
those raised by dry holes in oil and gas exploration and research costs that lead
up blind alleys: Should they be written off as current expenses or losses or be
capitalized to whatever future job (if any) might eventually be obtained? 190
Because of the small amounts involved, I would propose an easy-to-administer
rule, such as to deduct the cost currently unless either a job is obtained within a
year, or the search is for one's first (full-time) job,191 in which case the cost
should be capitalized and written off as described above.
d. Summary
My proposals with respect to educational, job-seeking, and moving
expenses would render obsolete the troublesome issue under current law as to
whether the education or the sought-after job was in the "same" business that
the taxpayer had been carrying on. Because that inquiry cannot be managed in
a just and coherent fashion, 192 it should be abolished. The suggested approach
would also avoid having to decide whether the underlying motive for changing
jobs was "business" or "personal" (such as a desire to live in a warmer climate
189 Cf I.R.C. § 132(a)(6), (g) (qualified moving expense reimbursement is an
excludable fringe benefit), added by § 13213(d)(2) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312. With the addition of this section, I.R.C.
§ 217 (Supp. IV 1992) should be repealed. See also U.S. DEP'T OF TREAS., BLUEPRINTS
FOR TAX REFORM, at 55 (1977) (moving expenses are "personal").
190 See DONALD E. KIESO & JERRY J. WEYGANDT, INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 543-
44 (4th ed. 1983); Frank M. Burke, Current Expensing of Geological and Geophysical
Costs: A Need for Legislative Carification, 34 OKLA. L. REV. 778, 786-87 (1981);
AccOuNTiNG FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CosTs, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 2, 12 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1974). The capitalized costs could be
deducted as a loss when the search is abandoned. Cf. Rev. Rul. 83-105, 1983-2 C.B. 51
(geological and geophysical outlays).
191 If a person was unemployed for at least a year or a student in a degree program,
any job sought would be deemed to be a "first" job for purposes of this rule.
192 According to the leading case in this area, Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515
(1976), aff'dper curiamn, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979),
the test is whether "different tasks and activities" are involved. Id. at 528. The case was
actually decided, however, on the basis of state licensing requirements. See id. at 528-30.
The latter test is easier to administer, but it favors business executives, who are all in the
business of being "managers," over professionals such as lawyers, doctors, nurses, and
accountants, who are subject to different licensing categories by various jurisdictions.
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or near family). The new job still produces wage income, 193 and the related
costs would be written off against the new income stream.
Notwithstanding the fact that job-seeking and moving outlays might be
distinguished from human capital, perhaps the technical problems in designing
a suitable writeoff for them should give one pause. Job-seeking and moving
outlays are closely analogous to human capital outlays, and the seeking of one's
first job (and moving to it) following higher education can be viewed as an
extension of the higher education itself. Moreover, the task of weeding out
lifestyle-motivated job searches and moves might well be intractable. Perhaps
decisively, because the presence or absence of any writeoff for job-seeking and
moving expenses is unlikely to affect behavior-whether because the job
seeking or moving is "personal," "involuntary" (to terminate unemployment),
or to seek increased wages-optimal taxation theory suggests not allowing any
writeoffs here. Although one is tempted to offer a narrow writeoff for the job-
seeking and moving outlays of the laid-off or chronically unemployed on
ability-to-pay grounds, the better approach is probably direct subsidy by way of
unemployment compensation, job-training programs, and employee
reimbursements to name a few.
This mode of analysis has potential application to other issues involving
employee work-related outlays, such as work clothing, tools, and the
development and maintenance of physical attributes. The first step in the
analysis would be to determine whether the outlay relates to (1) property of the
taxpayer, (2) the taxpayer's human capital (including her profession or line of
work), or (3) a particular job. The second step would be to determine whether
the outlay is a capital expenditure or an expense. The third step would be to
evaluate any possible writeoff in terms of fairness, economic policy, and tax
administration.
III. WOULD AMORTIZATION OF HIGHER-EDUCATION COSTS BE GOOD
POLICY?
As the foregoing indicates, I would emphatically reject the position that a
tax provision that satisfies the Haig-Simons definition of income is somehow
exempt from general policy scrutiny, whether one calls it "tax expenditure
analysis" or something else. 194 No special expertise is required to grasp the
point that the amortization proposal fails under an overall policy perspective.
193 There should be a requirement, as under current section 217(c)(2), that fu-time
work be obtained.
194 See supra note 8; see also Crane, supra note 77, at 86-90 (analyzing scholarship
exclusion both in terms of income definition and as tax expenditure); Mark G. Kelman,
Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Wty
They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831 (1979); McNulty, supra
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A. Revenue Effects
Under current budgetary law, revenue-losing bills are out of bounds unless
equal revenue raisers are included. 195 The amortization proposal is a clear
loser. In the 1990-91 academic year, total tuition and fees of institutions of
higher education exceeded $30 billion. 196 If one subtracts scholarships and
grants of about $12 billion, 197 that leaves an $18 billion net. The annual
revenue loss would depend on the amortization schedule, but eventually
(assuming a weighted average marginal tax rate of 30% against which the
amortization deductions are taken), the annual revenue loss will eventually
reach $6 billion a year, ignoring future tuition increases, tax rate increases,
student population increases (if any), and inflation. 198
The argument might be made that the net revenue loss is overestimated,
because (1) more graduates will earn more money and (2) positive externalities
will be generated that will improve the economy as a whole. However,
"positive externality" is a utility concept that does not necessarily translate into
increased income of taxpayers. Also, equal or greater income or positive
externalities or both may be created by alternative uses of the revenue involved.
It cannot even be assumed that greater aggregate wage income will be
generated. Initially, going to college and professional school usually entails
unemployment or underemployment, and this phenomenon would create an
immediate additional revenue loss. Furthermore, if amortization induces more
people to pursue higher education, wages of educated persons might be
depressed by oversupply 199 or by a perceived dilution in the value of the
note 2 (tuition payments generally are the same). See generally Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey
S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1662-63
(1992); Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public awice at Gucci Gulch: A
Procedural Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J 1165 (1993).
195 See Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, § 252(b), 2 U.S.C. § 902(b) (Supp. I
1991).
196 CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., supra note 47, at 35. This $30 billion figure is arrived
at by rough extrapolation from the 1987-88 figure of $27.9 billion. The 1985-86 figure was
$23 billion.
197 Id. at 11 (counting federal, state, and institutional grants). These figures are for
1990-91.
198 If the costs are amortized over 14 years, it will be 15 years before the annual
amortization deductions equal annual net tuition and fees, as new amortizers enter the work
force each year.
199 It is likely that low salaries for academics in the liberal arts is partly a function of
supply and demand. L.C. Solmon, The Range of Educational Benefits, in ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 83, 90. Given that the demand for education is somewhat
responsive to expectations of future earnings, see FREEMAN, supra note 11, at 208-09, 223-
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credentials. 200 In addition or in the alternative, wages of uneducated persons
might be pushed down further because the latter are perceived to lack minimum
credentials and be undesirable.20 1 In other words, the fact that education creates
wage differentiation does not logically lead to a result of greater aggregate
wage income.
The revenue loss could be contained by some cap on the costs eligible for
write-off.20 2 A plausible option might be to allow only annual costs to be
eligible for future write-off up to a fixed dollar figure (say, $5,000 per year)
selected to approximate the annual average resident tuition in public institutions
of higher learning-the theory being that any excess over the cap is deemed to
be "consumption" attributable to personal or family taste.203 Some might
object, however, to shortchanging private education, which is the one area
where market forces have some play, if imperfectly.
B. Goals of the Tax Expenditure
In terms of policy, the goal of a tax benefit for higher education costs must
be either or both of (1) making it cheaper for persons to obtain higher
education (subsidy effect) or (2) inducing more people to obtain higher
education (incentive effect). Either way, a tax benefit in the form of an
amortization deduction makes no sense.
1. Subsidy Effect
The case for offering a subsidy to students presupposes that education is
overpriced. This supposition is flatly contradicted by the human-capital
hypothesis (including the "screening" theory) and the fact that higher education
is heavily subsidized by government and charitable largess,204 because tuition
revenues account for only about a third of higher education expenditures. 20 5
24, it is probable that the demand for liberal arts education has declined in the last 30 years
relative to natural and hard social sciences.
200 See Robert H. Seidman, The Logic and Behavioural Principles of Educational
Systems: Social Independence or Dependence?, in Tim SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATIONAL
EXPANSIoN, supra note 25, at 267-92; Thurow, supra note 22, at 373-418.
201 See Olneck & Kim, supra note 23, at 193-94, 205 (focusing on high school
dropouts).
202 Argrett, supra note 1, at 657.
203 The literature is sparse on the relation, if any, between institutional prestige and
incomes. Again, there would be a causation problem, because success-motivated persons
may be more likely to attend the Yales and Stanfords than less prestigious institutions.
204 In 1990-91, tuition and fees averaged $1,809 at four-year public institutions and
$9,391 at private institutions. See CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., supra note 47, at 35. In 1988,
about 10.2 million students attended public institutions of higher education, and 2.9 million
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Using tax-base write-offs to provide subsidies is perverse: The value of the
subsidy is directly proportional to the taxpayer's highest marginal rate brackets
in the amortization years.206 In addition, the subsidy is collected well after the
costs are incurred. If the amortization period is substantial (for example, forty-
five years), or a ceiling is imposed on eligible costs, the tax savings will be
inconsequential both on a per-year basis and a present-value basis,207 especially
if the amortizable amount is not indexed for inflation.
An alternative justification for a subsidy is that the good or service is a
"necessity" that deserving people "can't afford." Calling higher education a
necessity is an exercise in political rhetoric, not a policy argument.20 8
2. Incentive Effect
No government benefit to students would be expected to operate as an
incentive to obtain higher education unless there is elasticity between obtaining
higher education and immediately entering the labor market. For most middle-
and upper-class children, higher education is the ascribed choice, especially
when existing subsidies are factored in, because they can both have their cake
(education) and eat it too (obtain parental support or borrow money cheaply,
and perhaps enjoy considerable leisure as well). 209 An incentive should be
directed at the margin, which in this case means members of the lower class,210
who not only are prone not to obtain higher education for cultural or
affordability reasons or both,,21 but also generally tend to think that college
students attended private institutions. 2 0FcE OF EDUC. RESEARCH AND IMPROVEMENT,
U.S. DEP'T EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 215 (1991).
205 THOMAS G. MORTENSON, WHY STUDENT FINANCIAL AID? 1 (ACT Student
Financial Aid Research Report Series No. 87-1, 1987).
206 Assuming taxpayers in the 15% and 39.5% rate brackets respectively, a deduction
of $1,000 saves $150 for the former and $395 for the latter.
207 The present value, at a 10% discount rate compounded annually, of a $22,500
deduction spread out over 45 years, assuming a 30% tax rate, is only $1,479. This amount
cannot be realized in advance, because it is not a property or contract right.
208 I.R.C. § 135 (Supp. HI 1991), allowing exclusion of interest on U.S. savings bonds
if the proceeds are used for education, is irrational policy-wise, because, if the basic idea is
sound, there is no reason to limit the investment to U.S. savings bonds.
209 There is some correlation between rising tuition and lower student enrollment,
particularly for two-year colleges. See MORTENSON, supra note 205, at 9-10.
210 Because identifying the margin as the lower class is a crude generalization, any
incentive tailored solely to the lower classes is bound to be inefficient.
211 The gap in college attendance between the highest and lowest family income
quartiles has increased significantly since 1980. See THOMAS G. MORTENSON, THE
REALLOCATION OF FINANCIAL AID FROM POOR TO MIDDLE INCOME AND AFFLUENT
STuDENTs 1978 TO 1990 at i (ACT Student Financial Aid Research Report Series No. 90-2,
1993]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
education is not worth the cost.212 But it would be wholly implausible to
hypothesize that an amortization deduction against future wage income would
provide a meaningful incentive at the margin for persons with low incomes. As
mentioned above, the present value of future amortization deductions would be
virtually zero.213 The would-be student, needing support now, would not be
able to obtain any current cash from the future tax benefit. Even a current
deduction would have little value: Most students would be near or below the
threshold of taxability.214 Any tax deduction would favor those who will find
themselves in higher income tax brackets in the future, but future income is not
likely to correlate with present need on any systematic basis. 215
The potential incentive effect of an amortization deduction might possibly
be stronger in the case of graduate and professional schools, which are not
usually considered necessities, so that parental support would likely be
reduced. On the other hand, part-time work is often either tolerated or built
into the education itself, through teaching and research assistantships and
internships. But the basic problems remain: The incentive is a deferred
economic benefit of small value that cannot be presently realized, and the effect
of the incentive is perverse.
C. Price Effects
It is axiomatic that a portion of any subsidy will be captured by the
provider of the subsidized goods and services, especially where the supply
1990). Not surprisingly, sensitivity to price changes appears to increase as family income
decreases. See MORTENSON, supra note 205, at 9-10.
212 A Gallup poll found that only 27% of those from families with incomes below
$20,000 thought that college was a sound investment, whereas 60% of those from families
with income above $50,000 thought so. MORTENSON, supra note 64, at 33.
213 See supra note 207. A more effective subsidy would be to allow interest on
educational loans to be deductible.
2 14 Gifts, support, scholarships, and loan proceeds are all excluded from gross income.
§§ 102(a) (gifts and bequests), 117(a) (qualified scholarships); Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S.
151 (1917) (support); see, e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (concerning
loan proceeds). Some students would obtain the standard deduction of slightly more than
$2,500, $3,000, $4,400, or $5,000, as indexed for inflation, depending on filing status. See
§ 63(c). However, the deduction is lost, except to the extent of the greater of $500 or
"earned income," if the student is being claimed as a dependency exemption by another
taxpayer. § 63(c)(5). The student may claim a personal exemption of slightly more than
$2,000, unless the student is being claimed as a dependency exemption by another taxpayer.
§ 151(a), (d)(2).
215 Wage income, on an aggregate basis, is at least partially a function of genes,
family upbringing, and social milieu. See supra notes 14-18. Students who must work have
less time available to study and to socialize.
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curve is relatively inelastic 216-which is typically the chief condition that gives
rise to the demand for a subsidy in the first place.217 Educators are not
incapable of appropriating additional educational resources for their own direct
or indirect benefit.218 Tuitions, at least at private institutions, have risen at a
faster rate than inflation over the last fifteen years. 219 As a professor, I would
welcome additional subsidies to education and students; as a parent I might
think twice.
D. Welfare Effects
The case for a tax expenditure for higher education in any form must
ultimately make out the case that more college, vocational, graduate, and
professional education is not just good for the students' lifestyles but also that
the benefits to society as a whole justify yet another government
intervention. 220 The public benefits of education are sometimes vaguely
denoted by such terms as "positive externalities" and "international economic
competitiveness." Indeed, public support for this education has traditionally
been marshaled along these lines, 221 although notions of "equality of
opportunity" and "minimal equipment for citizenship in a democracy" have
216 In laymen's terms, demand increases for a relatively fixed supply.
2 17 The submarket of education constituted by high-prestige, private boarding
institutions is quite inelastic, because institutional reputations change slowly, if at all.
218 Solnon, supra note 199, at 84; see CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES IN
HIGHER EDUCATION, GIVING YOUTH A BETTER CHANCE 175-77 (1979) [hereinafter GIVING
YOUTH A BETTER CHANCE]. From 1952-1970, faculty compensation increased in absolute
terms, and from 1970-1978 did not fare badly. Moreover, academic compensation is
surprisingly high considering market factors. See HOwARD BOwEN, THE COSTS OF HIGHER
EDUCATION 48-75 (1980). Affluent institutions devote a relatively higher percentage of their
resources to administration and other nonacademic staff. Id. at 19-23, 150. Of course,
increased expenditures per student might increase the quality of education at a particular
institution, but this result is not assured. Id. at 152-68. In any event, expenditures per
student do not correlate with increased earnings. James et al., supra note 24, at 250-51.
219 See Elson, supra note 64, at 54 (indicating that this trend is likely to persist for the
foreseeable future). For an argument that increasing costs are largely a function of
government regulation, see Margaret S. Gordon & Charlotte Alhadeff, Instructional Costs
and Productivity, 1930-1977, in THREE THOUSAND FUTURES 319 (Carnegie Council Policy
Studies in Higher Educ. 1980). See also Michael S. McPherson et al., Recent Trends in
U.S. Higher Education Costs and Pfices: The Role of Government Funding, 79 AM. ECON.
REV. 253, 255 (1989) (noting that elite private colleges devote a large portion of
incremental funding to scholarship programs and capital outlays, apparently to compete with
other like institutions for the best students).
220 See, e.g., Solmon, supra note 199, at 84.
221 See W.W. McMahon, Externalities in Education, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION,
supra note 10, at 133, 133 (listing possible positive externalities without quantifying them).
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also been prominent.222 However, the literature has not adequately quantified
the net positive externalities, especially for higher education, and without this
quantification policy discussion is severely hampered.
It is not enough to establish that more higher education is a good thing.
One must also ask whether the public spending on higher education is the best
use of scarce resources to improve aggregate social welfare (however
defined). 223 Also, the particular means of aiding higher education, that is,
through tax write-offs that provide benefits keyed to the highest marginal rate
brackets of individuals, must be preferable to other available means. 224 Finally,
one must ask whether all kinds of higher education are equally deserving of
government aid.
1. Do We Need More Professional and k7raduate Education?
The fact that professional education is widely perceived as offering a direct
and adequate return on educational investment is itself a compelling argument
against additional government across-the-board assistance to students.225 The
human-capital literature shows that the private rate of return declines at
progressively higher educational levels; in fact, negative rates of return exist
for certain graduate studies.226 These statistics are weak circumstantial
evidence that graduate and professional education does not provide sufficient
social benefits so as to justify increased government aid. More to the point, the
assumption that the U.S. needs more doctors, lawyers, and even scientists has
recently come under attack.227 This critique is given added force when one
222 See generally JOHN DEwEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCrION TO
THE PHiLOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (1916).
223 See, e.g., H.M. Levin, School Finance, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION, supra note
10, at 426-28.
224 See M. WoodhaU, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Education, in ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 348, 348.
225 See supra note 42 (discussing Texas tuition rates).
226 See supra note 24. Social status, on the other hand, appears to increase
disproportionately to ever-higher income educational levels. COLEMAN ET AL., supra note
50, at 68-78.
227 As to the legal profession, see STEPHEN P. MAGEE ET AL., BLACK HOLE TARIFFS
AND ENDOGENOUS POLICY THEORY 111-21 (1989); YEvIN M. MU'RHY Er AL., THE
ALLOCATION OF TALENT: IMPLICATIONS FOR GROWrH (National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper No. 3530, 1990), reprinted in 106 Q.J ECoN. 503 (1991) (both
arguing that the disproportionate number of lawyers in the U.S. may have a significant
negative effect on economic growth). But see Frank B. Cross, The First 77dng We Do, Let's
Kill All the Economists: An Empirical Evaluation of the Effect of Lawyers on the United
States Economy and Political System, 70 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1992). As to the health care
profession, see RICHARD D. LAMM, THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF HEALTH CARE 5-6 (May
1990); 1 COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
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considers that professions are adept at creating demand for their services and
the services of other professions.22 8 In addition, increased specialization in
professions commands a disproportionate amount of economic resources.229
It is no answer to say that we need more good lawyers or doctors, because
no single occupation should have a monopoly on talent and skills. Arguments
by lawyers to the effect that society is (or would be) better off because people
have (or should have) various substantive "rights" are problematical and self-
serving.23 0 Similarly, arguments by the elderly and health-care providers that
people are entitled to unlimited amounts of medical care would, if heeded,
likely bankrupt the economy and the federal fisc. 23 1
The market in graduate education does not appear to be subject to the
normal law of supply and demand, as the supply of Ph.D.s far exceeds the
demand for full-time tenure-track instructors, especially in the liberal arts. 23 2
SERvICES, FIRST REPORT OF THE COUNCIL 13-14 (1988). As to scientists, see Boyce
Rensberger, Scientist Shortfall a Myth, WASH. POST, April 9, 1992, at Al.22 8 See Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many
Lanyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 431, 471-73
(1989). Lawyers create demand for legal services by creating pervasive and complex
regulatory schemes and rules that promote litigation, all of which puts pressure on other
professions to increase the level of the services they provide. Tax, securities, corporate, and
regulatory laws create vast demand for accountants. Family, labor, and criminal law creates
a need for incremental criminal justice personnel, mental health professionals, and alternate
dispute resolution professionals. Tort and environmental law impact upon the health care
and engineering professions. Technological and financial innovations require new and more
complex legal regimes. See, e.g., Symposiun-New Financial Products, the Modem Process
of Financial Innovation, and the Law, 69:6 TEx. L. REv. vii; see also supra note 35.
229 See Mwangi Kimenyi, Rent-Seeking in the Academy: The Political Economy of
Specialty Programs, ACADEMIC QUESTIONS, Spring 1992, at 41; Julie Kosterlitz, Wanted:
GPs, NAT'L J., Sept. 5, 1992, at 2011.
230 Briefly, individual rights can conflict with each other or the social good or both,
needlessly complicating (or even stalemating) policy-making. See, e.g., T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 946-47 (1987).
231 See MARK I. WARSHAWSKY, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys.,
PROjECrIONS OF HEALTH CARE EXPENDrruREs AS A SHARE OF GNP: ACUruARIAL AND
ECONOMIC APPROACHES 1-4 (1991) (estimating that health care costs will constitute between
30% and 50% of the GNP by the year 2065); Sally T. Sonnefeld et al., Projections of
National Health Expenditures Through the Year 2000, 13 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 1,
13 (1991) (estimating that health care expenditures will take up 24.1% of the federal budget
by the year 2000). Unlike consumer goods or even wealth, which are subject to the "law"
of declining marginal utility, there is no inherent limit on the demand of individuals to be
kept alive and in good health as long as possible. See generally Symposium, The Law and
Policy of Health Care Rationing: Models and Accountability, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1505
(1992).
2 32 See supra notes 31-32.
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An amortization deduction for graduate students could only aggravate this
situation, which is in the self-interest of universities to maintain.23 3
My point is only that we cannot simply asswne that we need more
professionals and graduate students. In addition, it is doubtful that the complex
problems pertaining to various professions can be appreciably solved by a
"program" of indiscriminate assistance to all students in higher education in the
form of an amortization deduction.
2. Is There a Shortage of College Graduates?
The U.S. has by far the highest percentage of college enrollment of any
major developed country, about twice the level of Western Europe.2 3 4 In fact,
about 400,000 foreign students obtain higher education in the U.S. each
year.23 5 Because the standard of living in the U.S. is losing ground relative to
many other advanced economies, 23 6 three possible hypotheses suggest
themselves: (1) the huge investment in college education does not in fact give
the U.S. a substantial competitive advantage, (2) an educational advantage
might exist, but it is outweighed by other negative inputs, and (3) college
education largely compensates for inadequate education at lower levels. None
of these hypotheses implies the allocation of yet more public resources to
college education.237
233 Graduate students provide a cheap source of teachers and research assistants, and
the oversupply of Ph.D.s creates a situation of intense job competition that yields high
productivity, often in nontenure track low-paying positions. But what is good for
universities is not necessarily good for the rest of society, as intellectual resources are
diverted from other productive uses.
234 N.L. Hicks, Education and Economic Growth, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION,
supra note 10, at 101, 102.
235 Jill Smolowe, The Pursuit of Excellence, TIME, Apr. 13, 1992, at 59.
236 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 92D CONG., 1ST SEss., FACToRs AFFECTING
THE INTERNATIONAL COMPETIVNESS Or THE UNITED STATES 3, 16, 17 (Comm. Print
1991).
237 The resources should be allocated to lower educational levels or other areas
(applied technology, industrial organization, aggregate savings, on-the-job training) where
the U.S. might be at a comparative disadvantage. See, e.g., JOB TRAINING PARTNERSHIP
ACT ADVISORY COMM. TO THE U.S. SEC'Y OF LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WORKING
CAPITAL: COORDINATED HuMAN INvESTmENT DIRECTIONS FOR THE 90's 11-13 (Mar. 1989)
(analyzing literacy and drop-out prevention); GIVING YOUTH A BETTER CHANCE, supra note
218, at 185-98. Mark Blaug & John Mace, Recurrent Education-The New Jerusalem, in
EDUCATION OF AN ECONOMIST, supra note 10, at 143 (noting recurrent education, as a
substitute for full-time postsecondary schooling, refers to modules of education provided
from time to time, throughout life, during interrupted periods of full-time employment).
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Although it appears that employment over the last fifty years has shifted
towards more-educated and higher-paying occupations, 238 this point bears on
the private-as opposed to public-desirability of expanded higher education.
From the point of view of economic development, the literature stresses
investment in primary education and on-the-job training.239 Similarly, most of
the positive externalities attributed to education (lower crime rates, lower
dependence on welfare, better health, more efficient markets, democratic
values), by their nature, show diminishing marginal returns with incremental
levels of education. 240 Indeed, too much education entails negative
externalities: An over-educated work force tends to have low morale, resulting
in an actual loss of productivity.241
According to the screening theory, higher education is overrated as a
contributor to productivity and growth; 242 it mainly selects out those
individuals who will be trained by employers and offered the opportunity to
move up the career ladder.243 The screening hypothesis suggests that more of
the financial burden of higher education should be borne by private industry
rather than the public.244 Moreover, insofar as desirable employee traits are a
function of the personal maturation process, higher education performs
238 Kevin M. Murphy & Finis Welch, Occupational Change and the Demand for Skill,
1940-1990, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 122, 122 (1993).
239 P. Foster, The Contribution of Education to Development, in EcoNoMIcs OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 93, 100; see I-Ecks, supra note 234, at 101, 103, 106; STAFF
OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 236, at 55 (noting reluctance of firms to bear
cost ofjob training where work force is highly mobile).
240 See Robert W. Hartman, The Rationale for Federal Support for Higher Education,
in DoEs COLLEGE MATrER? SoME EVIDENCE OF THE IMPACrS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 271,
278-85 (Lewis C. Solmon & Paul 3. Taubman eds., 1973). Some positive externalities of
higher education are social tolerance, slightly higher propensity to save, more efficient
spending on consumption, and greater attention to childrearing (especially education!). See
Charlotte Alhadeff & Margaret S. Gordon, Higher Education and Human Perfornance, in
THREE THOUSAND FuTuR s, supra note 219, 219-39.
241 See RUSsELL W. RUMBERGER, OVEREDUCATION IN THE U.S. LABOR MARKET 101-
16 (1981); Val Burris, The Social and Political Consequences of Overeducation, 48 AM.
Soc. REv. 454 (1983); H.M. Levin, Work and Education, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION,
supra note 10, at 147, 152-53.
2 42 Mark Blaug, Where Are We Now in the Economics of Education?, in EDUCATION
OF AN ECONOMIST, supra note 10, at 129.
2 43 See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
244 See Rudolph G. Penner, Economic Growth, in CHALLENGE TO LEADERSHIP 67, 86
(Isabel V. Sawhill ed., 1988).
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noneducational functions (such as "parking" and socialization), for which
cheaper and more efficient substitutes could be devised. 245
The fact that advances in standard of living are largely a function of
technology suggests that any additional government subsidies for education be
concentrated in the natural sciences and engineering.246 On the other hand, and
despite common wisdom to the contrary, evidence exists to the effect that there
really is no shortage of scientists and engineers in the United States.247 In any
event, it would be awkward to discriminate by way of the tax system in favor
of particular academic disciplines. 248 Nonfavored disciplines would explicitly
be labeled, by the terms of a law of general applicability, as second-class.
Nor is it certain that increased public investment in education will result in
an increased aggregate private investment return. At certain times and places,
there appears to have been too much higher education,249 in which case the
value of a college degree as a credential was diluted by oversupply, resulting in
a narrowing of the gap between the starting wages of college and high school
graduates. 250 Although some might favor the narrowing of income disparities,
oversubsidizing higher education is a bizarre technique of achieving it. At other
times (such as the present), the gap widens,2 51 which in itself may be
undesirable, not to mention the fact that aggregate wages fail to rise due to the
decline in the wages of the noneducated. 25 2
245 The armed services perform similar functions for a predominately low income
clientele. This analysis leaves out of account the issue of the social value of research
performed by university faculties and the appropriate blend of teaching and research.
246 See Becker, supra note 10, at 351.
247 See ScHEETz, supra note 42, at vii (providing that demand for sciences and
engineering graduates among college recruiters was comparable to other areas, although
bachelors degrees in certain engineering fields and computer science command highest
starting salaries); Rensberger, supra note 227.
248 Discrimination already exists under I.R.C. section 174 (Supp. I1 1991), where
"research" is limited to scientific and technological research, not to research in the
humanities and social sciences. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (1987).
249 See CAROLwE BiRD, THE CASE AGAINST COLLEGE 116-35 (1975); Richard B.
Freeman, Overinvestment in College Training?, 10 . HuM. RESOURcES 287 (1975).
250 The gap narrowed in the 1970s but widened again in the 1980s, perhaps due to (1)
greater need for computer literacy and (2) a declining manufacturing sector attributable to
trade imbalances. Lawrence F. Katz & Kevin M. Murphy, Changes in Relative Wages,
1963-1987 Supply and Demand Factors, 107 Q.J. ECON. 35, 35-37 (1992).
251 See id. For another overview of trends, see Margaret S. Gordon & Charlotte
Alhadeff, The Labor Market and Higher Education, in THREE THOUSAND FUTURES, supra
note 219, at 176.
252 See John Bound & George Johnson, Changes in the Structure of Wages in the
1980's.: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations, 82 AM. EcoN. REv. 371, 389 (1992)
(suggesting a shortage of college graduates in the 1980s); Hicks, supra note 234, at 101,
103.
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Increased higher education, therefore, does not necessarily translate into a
narrowing of the gap between the rich and the poor or equality of
opportunity.25 3 Government educational subsidies, especially at the state and
local level, operate regressively overall benefiting the well-off at the expense of
the poor,25 4 and even need-based scholarship aid may have the effect of
subsidizing the middle class while being insufficient to attract the lower
classes. 25 5 The shift during the 1980s from grant programs to loan programs
has widened the gap between the well-off and the poor with respect to the
utilization of higher education. 25 6
In addition to the human capital hypothesis, there already exist ample
pressures to increase the availability of higher education. Since the early 1970s,
advances in technology have eliminated the need for much unskilled and semi-
skilled labor, resulting in a split of the labor market into primary and secondary
segments: In the former, firms will train employees to move up the ladder; in
the latter both wages and career-advancement opportunities are low.257 During
times when the supply of sufficiently-educated entrants into the job market
exceeds the number of new slots in the primary segment, an aspiring worker
faces the choice of being permanently under-employed or else of having to
obtain still more educational credentials. 25 8 Thus, the screening function of
education appears to create a dynamic that requires more and more layers of it
in order to function properly. 25 9
The same dynamic operates on the social level. Higher education for the
masses drives the (future) elite to differentiate themselves by obtaining high-
prestige college degrees260 and graduate or professional degrees. 261 The middle
253 See JENCKS, supra note 18, at 7-8 (noting, inter alia, that education alone has little
impact on the percentage of the population below the poverty level).
254 This issue is reviewed in Mark Blaug, The Distibutional Effects of Higher
Education Subsidies, 2 EcON. EDUC. REv. 209 (1982), reprinted in EDUCATION OF AN
ECONOMIST, supra note 10, at 204.
255 See W. Lee Hansen, Impact of Student Financial Aid on Access, in THE CRISIS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 84, 91-96 (Joseph Froomkin ed., 1983).
25 6 See MORTENSON, supra note 64, at i.
257 The literature is summarized in N. Bosanquet, Internal Labour Markets and
Education, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 164-66.
258 jp. Jallade, Youth Unemployment and Education, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION,
supra note 10, at 166, 169.
259 If all entrants into the labor market were to have high school diplomas, then the
diplomas would be worthless as credentials: some further credential would be needed to sort
them out. See Seidman, supra note 200, at 267, 285-86.
260 Parental willingness to pay significantly higher fees for private education can be
explained in terms of social stratification. The very fact that something is more expensive
often renders it more desirable. See Daniel Levy, The Rise of Private Universities in Latin
America and the United States, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION, supra note
25, at 107-15. At the same time, the concept of "elite" may vary among institutions.
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class views higher education as the ticket to upward mobility, demanding more
of it,262 but the elite can always stay one step ahead. 263
Institutional factors also contribute to the expansion of higher education. 2
64
Public higher education follows the "law" of bureaucratic growth.265 Heavy
subsidies even to private institutions, combined with the market and non-
market returns, render higher education an irresistible bargain. Expansion is
limited only by the reluctance of legislators to raise taxes or tuition or both,
and nervousness by administrators over the possibility of setting prices in
excess of what the traffic will bear.266 Additional government aid through a tax
write-off would only feed the higher-educational Leviathan without extracting a
significant social benefit in return.
3. Do We Need More Vocational Education?
The whole project of institutional vocational education is subject to
criticism in that it fails to inculcate transferable skills and adaptability to further
training. It is not surprising, therefore, that traditional institutional vocational
education generates a very low private rate of return. 267 Thus, it is a dubious
candidate for heavy public investment of a generic sort, although vocational
education aimed at drop-outs and welfare recipients might have value.
However, a tax write-off aimed at this group would be pointless in the extreme.
Private colleges in high demand with high tuitions and large endowments may seek (and be
able to afford) to breed an elite of intellectual meritocracy (as opposed to a pure social
class). Nevertheless, it appears that there is a trend among elite private colleges to consider
ability to pay in granting admissions. The result is a higher proportion of students from
families with incomes above $100,000. Mary Jordan, 'Need-Blind' Admissions Policy at
Top Private Colleges Losing Favor to Wealth, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 1992, at Al.
261 See B.R. Chiswick & C.U. Chiswick, Income Distribution and Education, in
ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 255, 260.
262 See B.C. Sanyal, Graduate Unemployment and Education, in ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 172, 175.
263 See Benoit Millot, Educational Potlatch as a Mode of Social Regulation in France,
in THE SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION, supra note 25, at 205, 208-09 (noting that
various factors prevent widespread education from generating widespread social equality).
264 For a general discussion of the growth in higher education, see generally THE
SOCIOLOGY OF EDUCATIONAL EXPANSION, supra note 25.
265 See generally William J. Bennett, Our Greedy Colleges, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18,
1987, at A31; see also McPherson et al., supra note 219, at 254 (noting different responses
in differing segments of the market).
266 Reduced or static governmental support can in some cases be more than made up
for by increased private support. See also supra note 42.
267 RANDALL COLLINS, THE CREDENTIAL SOCIETY 16-17 (1979); GIVING YOUTH A
BETTER CHANCE, supra note 218, at 137.
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Most "real" vocational education consists of in-house skill and job
training.268 Employers know their own needs much better than do academic
institutions.269 From this perspective, formal vocational education seems
mostly superfluous. 270 If any government interventions are in order, they
should be directed at private employers, not students. 271 In fact, at least two tax
expenditure programs already exist of this type, the targeted-jobs credit272 and
the exclusion for employer-provided education.273
4. What Do We Need?
What the educational system probably needs most is more and earlier
education at the bottom274 and better education in the middle.275 With respect
to international economic competitiveness, greater resources should be devoted
to job training in the private sector.276 It has been repeatedly shown that the
268 See LESTER C. THUROW, DANGEROUS CuRaNTs 173-215 (1983) (stating that on-
the-job training is the primary mode of acquiring human capital). See generally
EMPLOYMENT & UNEMPLOYMENT IN EUROPE 35 (Jean-Pierre Jallade ed., 1981).
269 See C. Benson, 7he Planning of Vocational Education, in ECONOMICS OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 323, 323-24.
270 But cf. BECKER, supra note 10, at 20-27 (making a distinction between "general,"
i.e., transferable skills, which an employee would pay for in a rational market, and
"specific" skills of use only to the particular employer).
271 See generally GIVING YOUTH A BETTER CHANCE, supra note 218, at 94, 95, 107-
52, 230-44.
272 
.R.C. § 51 (Supp. iH 1991), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 420, 556; I.R.C. § 52
(Supp. 1 1991).
273 I.R.C. § 127 (Supp. 111 1991), amended by 107 Stat. 312, 420; see also § 117(c)
(for employees of educational institutions only).
274 There is virtually unanimous support that early education is the most cost-effective
way to prevent failure, meaning illiteracy, dropping out of school, and failure to obtain
minimum skills. See, e.g., RESEARCH AND POLICY COMM., COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEV.,
IVEsTING IN AMERICA'S FuruRE 21 (1988).
275 See generally EDUCATION REFORM IN THE '90s (Chester E. Finn & Theodor
Rebarber eds., 1992) (focusing on school administration); GIVING YOUTH A BETrER
CHANCE, supra note 218, at 177, 208-09 (1979) (recommending increased federal funding
for secondary schools, but not mentioning tax benefits); David Card & Alan B. Krueger,
Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education and the Characteristics of Public Schools
in the United States, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1992) (stating that quality of public schools, as
measured by such factors as student-teacher ratios and teacher salaries, positively correlates
with lifetime earnings). One study opines that the U.S. spends less than most other industrial
nations on primary and secondary education. EDITH M. RASELL & LAWRENCE MiSHEL,
SHORTCHANGING EDUCATION (Economic Policy Inst. Briefing Paper, 1990).
276 See DAVID OSBORNE, ECONOMIC POL'Y INST., ECONOMIC COMPETrITVENESS: THE
STATES TAKE THE LEAD 62-65 (1987); Michael L. Wachter, The Training Component of
Growth Policies, in REMOVING OBSTACLES TO ECONOMIC GROWrH 41, 59 (Michael L.
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greatest private and social rate of return inures to primary education. 277 Also,
the primary and secondary school system needs to be made more efficient, so
that basic literacy and problem-solving skills can be imparted at a reasonably
early age.278 Over the last thirty years, expenditures per pupil have tripled,
while performance has stagnated. 279 Young people should not have to merely
"serve time" in school when they could be experimenting with careers.
Primary and secondary schools should be less rigid with respect to promotions
and ages; students should be able to "drop out," as in college. None of these--
or other-reform possibilities suggest a tax write-off for students of higher
education.280
Ultimately, advocates of greater investment in human capital must
accommodate themselves to the claimed need for greater investment in business
capital and high technology.281 A tax break pertaining to higher education
would be expected to come to some degree at the expense of conventional
investment. The government does not have unlimited resources to parcel out.
E. Distributional Effects
An amortization deduction would primarily benefit the upper classes, who
value and use education and who are mostly itemizers. 282 This bias would be
aggravated if the amortizable cost included amounts received by gift and
bequest but not by scholarship. Moreover, the benefit would be a windfall
largely for behavior that would have been undertaken without the tax break.
Wachter & Susan M. Wachter eds., 1984). See generally GIvNG YOUrH A BE-rER
CHANCE, supra note 218, at 107-52; M. Woodhall, Financing Vocational and Industrial
Education, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 439, 442.
277 See supra note 240.
278 A survey of college recruiters lists the following as employer needs least well
served by college education: written and oral communications skills, decisionmaking skills,
attitude toward the work ethic, judgment skills, and maturity. Technical expertise and
general business skills are well down the list. SCHBETz, supra note 42, at 41.
279 See John E. Chubb & Erik A. Hanushek, Reforming Educational Reform, in
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES: POLICY FOR THE NINETIES 213, 217 (Henry J. Aaron ed.,
1990).
280 Cy Courses of Action, in THMR THOUSAND FUTURES, supra note 219, 118, at
125-27 (discussing optimal role of federal government in improving higher education,
without mentioning tax breaks for students and parents).
281 Isenbergh, supra note 153, at 284-86.
282 See supra note 212.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The amortization of higher education outlays is not compelled by tax
theory, whether it be neutrality, Haig-Simons income, horizontal equity, or
ability-to-pay. If anything, analysis of both theory and principles rejects
amortization of student educational costs.
The amortization proposal suffers from all of the usual procedural defects
of tax expenditures: The goal is not clearly defined; the means do not conform
to any reasonable ends; in terms of revenue, allocative efficiency, social
welfare, and distributional effects, the costs are ignored and the benefits simply
assumed to exist; alternative uses of government funds are not examined; and
no mechanism is offered to monitor the tax expenditure program once in place.
An examination of the merits also indicates that student write-offs of tuition
costs would be an extremely poor kind of tax expenditure.
If aid to students attending university is politically necessary, the basic
choice is between direct aid based on need and making educational loans freely
available. Adequate need-based aid could improve equality of opportunity and
social mobility. On the other hand, it might attract free riders who have no real
ambition. Loans would be seen as a means of rationalizing the market in
education, because loans are not usually made available on the "security" of
future wages. It would make sense for a student to borrow money if the rate of
return on the education exceeded the loan interest rate.283 However, students
may not calculate costs and benefits in a rational fashion. With no "real"
security, loans may be viewed as free money. Given the likelihood of frequent
default, it would be hard to design a student loan program without a substantial
subsidy element.284
The problem of social human-capital investment, if any, lies far deeper
than the tax system's influence on the allocation of material resources. The
problem lies in the quality of education and parenting, especially at the pre-
college level, not an inadequate quantity of higher education. If there is social
underinvestment in certain types of education, it would be desirable to target
the government intervention as narrowly as possible. A generic tax break for
students obtaining higher education would divert social resources to the well-
off without any gains in either the educational system or society at large.
Analysis of the amortization proposal has also exposed the poverty of much
tax policy analysis carried on by legal academics, particularly the dogmatic
283 See J. Wiseman, Public Finance in Education, in ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION,
supra note 10, at 436, 438. See generally M. Woodhall, Student Loans, in ECONOMIfCS OF
EDUCATION, supra note 10, at 445.
284 It has been estimated that current government loan programs contain a subsidy
component (im the social aggregate) of 25-55% of the amount lent. See BARRY P.
BOSWORTH ET AL., BRooxiNGs INsT., THE ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL CREDrr PRoGRAMS 132-
35 (1987).
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reliance on such concepts as Haig-Simons income, neutrality, and personal
consumption. On the positive side, freedom from the constraints imposed by
these concepts should open up fruitful opportunities to explore one of the more
fundamental issues pertaining to the income tax base, namely, what should be
deducted under the rubric of "business or investment."
